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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of two topics in economic development. Chapter 1 studies 
the effect of higher compensation from a stable, local revenue source, on the 
performance of local government leaders. Much of modern development efforts are 
channeled through traditional local governance. Yet, despite their importance as 
politician bureaucrats, local leaders are rarely paid a living wage. This paper studies 
the effect of awarding chiefs cultivation rights over village rice land, a stable revenue 
generating asset, during their term of office. Using original data collected from the field 
and a fuzzy spatial regression discontinuity design, I find that higher compensation 
paid out from a within-village revenue source historically attracts leaders of higher 
quality and orientates them away from the interests of supra-village elites.
Chapter 2 studies the long-run implications of ethnic segregation for the formation 
of identity politics. Despite its salience, we have little quantitative evidence on the 
extent to which segregation leads to the formation of identity politics. This paper uses 
a large-scale historical resettlement program in British Malaya to understand this. 
Specifically, I study the effects of resettlement during the Malayan Communist 
Emergency (1948-1962). To cut-off communist support, British troops corralled and 
relocated 500,000 rural ethnic Chinese squatters into 550 wired-in mono-ethnic 
Chinese New Villages – regardless of actual sympathies. These ethnically segregated
v
villages continue to exist today. Results suggest that higher intergroup contact is
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Why Pay The Chief? Land Rents and
Political Selection in Indonesia
1.1 Introduction
Traditional local leaders are important for rural development. They perform state-like
functions and are responsible for development in rural areas where modern state
bureaucracy does not exist. Yet, positions of traditional local leadership are rarely
paid and local leaders are typically appointed to de facto or de jure hereditary
positions. The absence of these features of modern governance poses a central challenge
to development economists: despite the association between local leaders and under
development (Acemoglu et al., 2014; Anderson et al., 2015; Banerjee and Iyer, 2005),
there are few settings in which we can study how increasing rents might improve local
governance. Variation in rents alone is also insufficient. For higher rents to have any
bite, we need robust selection mechanisms to be in place. More broadly, we have no
clear evidence on the long-run effects of higher political pay on the performance of
executive leaders at any level (Besley, 2005; Dal Bó and Finan, 2018; Besley, 2004).
This challenge is further compounded by the lack of systematic data on compensation
and characteristics of individuals who stand for office in rural village settings.
My paper answers the following question: In the context of locally elected leaders,
how do persistent differences in political land rents affect performance and long-run
economic development? Using a fuzzy spatial regression discontinuity design, I find
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that higher rents historically attracted higher quality leaders who perform better in
office. So much so, that villages under their control are richer and more developed
even today. Ex ante, however, the effect of higher rents on development is ambiguous.
On one hand, much of the literature has documented the widespread capture of public
goods or civil society by traditional local leaders (Acemoglu et al., 2014; Anderson
et al., 2015; Banerjee and Iyer, 2005). In these settings of weak state capacity, higher
rents might simply lead to greater capture and worse development. On the other hand,
higher rents in urban municipalities are associated with positive performance of city
legislators and mayors. Increases in rents cause positive selection of Italian mayors
who reduce the size of municipal government (Gagliarducci and Nannicini, 2013).
Similarly, higher rents lead to positive selection of Brazilian municipal legislators
who construct more public goods (Ferraz and Finan, 2009). Due to the short time
horizon, however, these papers do not examine downstream impacts on economic
development. My contribution is to clearly identify how higher rents for local leaders
drive long-run economic development.
I do so by studying a historical natural experiment in which cultivation rights over
village rice land, or tanah bengkok, were awarded to village chiefs in Indonesia. Chiefs,
in turn, are obligated to sharecrop or lease out the land to villagers at fixed prices
and sales from the rice harvest serve as their rents from office. My analysis focuses on
plausibly exogenous variation in higher rents that arose during the Dutch Cultivation
System where some, but not all, chiefs were awarded bengkok rights in return for
enforcing the cultivation of export crops.1 Furthermore, Indonesia is well-suited to
studying the effects of higher rents because it is one of the few countries with genuine
1It is well-documented that the largest and worst incidences of famine in colonial Java occurred
during this time period as farmers were forced to give up land and labor for the cultivation of lucrative
cash crops for Dutch export. See, amongst others, Van Niel (1972) and Fasseur (1992) for an overview
of the impact of the Cultivation system on Java. Notably, Dell and Olken (2017) documents positive
modern-day development outcomes arising from persistence in Dutch infrastructure constructed
during the Cultivation System.
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elections at the village level. Chief elections were introduced by Dutch colonial powers
in the early nineteenth century and, under Dutch rule, chiefs were elected to positions
for life. In 1979, however, national laws were amended and chiefs today are elected to
fixed terms of 6-8 years each. The absence of re-election incentives before 1979 will
be crucial for interpretation of later results.
Research on local governance is often stymied by limited data.2 To explore
political outcomes, I build an original dataset of modern village electoral history
(1979-2014) from oral and written histories of 931 chiefs in 193 villages collected
through thousands of hours of in-depth qualitative interviews. The final dataset
includes detailed biographical information on all 2,297 candidates who ever ran for
village office including education and previous occupation. I combine my survey
data with administrative data to capture measures of chief performance and village
development.
Specifically, I study the effects of differences in bengkok rights across a historical
border – between two Dutch administrative units of Priangan and Cirebon – in West
Java that arose due to Dutch perceptions of differences in traditional systems of
remuneration. Crucially, this border did not exist prior to Dutch intervention. A
frontier region, the entire Priangan-Cirebon border was relatively homogenous with
little village administration and no history of bengkok. It was only with the need
to streamline administration that the region was split into two parts, and lacking
knowledge on the interior of Java, the Dutch simply drew borders based on salient
geographical features. These arbitrary borders, however, formed the basis for the
differential reward and persistence of bengkok rights throughout Cirebon but not in
Priangan. Bengkok was imposed up to the borders of Cirebon due to the pre-existence
of bengkok practices in central Cirebon. Bengkok was not extended across the border
2An exception is Acemoglu et al. (2014) that collected detailed oral histories on the families of
all paramount chiefs in Sierra Leone.
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to Priangan because it did not exist anywhere there and was deemed foreign to natives.
These differences in bengkok and land rents still exist today and leaves us with both
a treatment and control group.
The Dutch drew much of the border following salient geographical features of
mountains and rivers. To address potential confounding factors from differences in
geography, I focus exclusively on the southern portion of the historical boundary that
transects mountain ranges, and I show that villages along this border are balanced
on pre-determined geographical characteristics and rice fertility. Historical evidence
suggests that variation in bengkok rights was the only difference in historical colonial
policy across my study border. To address concerns regarding other possible cross-border
differences in colonial policy, I digitize 1853 and 1945 Dutch Colonial maps and show
that my results are robust to controlling for any differences in historical colonial
infrastructure investment.
Two features of my setting allow me to isolate higher land rents as the most
salient effect of bengkok. First, individual property rights of farmers in Indonesia are
relatively secure. Together with ownership rights of bengkok land belonging to the
village and not the chief, this rules out greater security of property rights over bengkok
land as a possible mechanism.3 Second, bengkok plots are relatively small. Across
villages, the average size of bengkok land under chief control is 1.6 ha compared to
158 ha of cultivable rice land under individual ownership of farmers. The small size
of bengkok plots rules out changes in land inequality as a downstream effect of larger
bengkok land rights.
Importantly, bengkok is not an institution unique to Indonesia. Throughout
3The existence of secure individual property rights of farmers in the Indonesian setting contrasts
markedly from Goldstein and Udry (2008) who show that, within a context of insecure property
rights, traditional political authority in Ghanaian villages gives traditional chiefs more secure land
rights over agricultural land plots. With more secure land rights, chiefs are more willing to fallow
their land for longer periods of time. This results in greater agricultural productivity of chief land
compared to land owned by ordinary farmers.
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medieval Europe, it was common for sovereigns to grant taxation or land rights
(apanage) to nobles or military personnel to compensate them for their duties in
administering different parts of the kingdom (Darling, 1996). Similar practices existed
in India where upper caste members and government officials were granted land rights
in return for performing administrative duties (Sharma, 1957). What is unique to
Indonesia is the persistence of these practices. This allows me to investigate how
the use of land rents as compensation has affected modern-day outcomes on local
governance and development.
My findings point to a strong positive effect of bengkok land rents on contemporary
economic development. Bengkok villages today continue to exhibit stronger nighttime
light intensity and all villagers, on average, continue to enjoy lower child mortality and
higher years of education. Positive development outcomes are a result of better chief
performance. Villages where chiefs are paid higher bengkok rents receive more funds
from both higher levels of government and from villagers. This suggests that chiefs
are better at both lobbying and raising funds from local villagers. Along with the
ability to raise more revenue, chiefs in bengkok villages provide more public goods:
An increase in 1 hectare of bengkok leads to a 0.22 standard deviation increase in
village infrastructure public goods such as access to roads, safe water and safe garbage
disposal.
Why do chiefs today continue to perform better? I find evidence consistent with
historically positive political selection of chiefs. As mentioned above, prior to 1979,
chiefs were elected for life. Hence, in the absence of re-election incentives, any positive
outcomes of chief effort we observe during this period of time would almost surely
have to be a result of political selection. I do not, however, observe characteristics of
chiefs who took office before 1979. Instead, to test for historical political selection, I
examine differences in pre-1979 village school construction and educational outcomes
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of villagers. In the complete absence of top-down school provision before the late
1970s (Aritonang, 1994; Duflo, 2001; Djajadiningrat, 1940), the construction of village
schools were led entirely by bottom-up chief efforts. Indeed, I find that bengkok
villages report a greater number of historical village schools. More village schools
translates into actual educational outcomes. Using 100% count census data, I document
that bengkok villagers have consistently higher years of education going as far back as
the 1920s: cohorts born in 1920 have 1.2 more years of education relative to a mean
of 3.6 years. These results suggest that persistently higher land rents attracted higher
quality chiefs in the past who were better able to lead historical school construction
efforts.
Persistently higher villager education has positive spillovers on the quality of the
entire candidate pool today. Original survey data shows that the entire candidate
pool in bengkok villages today is marginally more highly educated and more likely
to be drawn from civil service occupations. Specifically, an increase in 1 hectare of
bengkok leads to the entire candidate pool having 0.3 years more education relative
to a mean of 11 years. Candidates are also 3.6pp more likely to have previous
occupations as civil servants relative to a mean of 21%. Once I account for the
average education of all villagers, however, bengkok candidates are not more educated
nor selected from civil service occupations in comparison to non-bengkok candidates.
In other words, persistently higher bengkok land rents attracted better quality chiefs
historically. These chiefs were so effective at providing village schools that bengkok
villagers became persistently more educated over time and those who stand for chief
elections today are no more educated than the average villager.
As mentioned above, chiefs today are no longer elected for life but are elected
to fixed terms of 6-8 years each. This suggests that better performance of bengkok
chiefs today could also be driven by enhanced re-election incentives. I do not find
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evidence for this. On average, only 18% of incumbent chiefs re-run for office and an
increase in bengkok rents is not associated with an increase in the probability that
a chief re-runs for office. This is despite the fact that an incumbent who re-runs for
office has a re-election probability of 46% and this is somewhat higher for bengkok
chiefs. The lack of re-election incentives is consistent with observations from the
field. Ex-village chiefs frequently cite heavy chief responsibilities and insufficient 
remuneration as reasons for not choosing to run for a second term.
I close by investigating why, in the absence of re-election incentives and 
contemporary selection on observable education and occupation, bengkok land rents 
continue to cause positive development. One possibility is that the within-village 
nature of bengkok land could have attracted chiefs who are more oriented towards local 
villager interests and away from the interests of external elites. Indeed, I find that 
bengkok villages are less likely to vote for Golkar, a party synonymous with Suharto’s 
authoritarian rule from 1965 - 1998. Given rich literature documenting the role of 
chiefs in turning out the vote for Golkar, these findings are consistent with bengkok 
rents strengthening the chief position and attracting chiefs who are less dependent on 
both supra-village government and village elite interests. Instead, bengkok rents 
attracts chiefs whose interests consistently align with village development.
The positive association between bengkok rents and economic development 
contrasts with the well-established hypothesis that areas governed through 
traditional local governance (indirect colonial rule) perform more poorly, on 
average, compared to regions directly governed through colonial administrators (direct 
colonial rule) (Mamdani, 1997). Why did indirect colonial rule through bengkok 
chiefs not lead to worse outcomes? The reason is that across Java the Dutch 
ruled entirely through local leaders. Hence, the counterfactual to bengkok chiefs 
was not direct governance by colonial administrators. Instead, in places without 
8
bengkok, qualitative literature suggests that villagers often elected the village fool to 
office (Antlöv, 1994). In contrast, I show that bengkok rents attracted higher quality 
chiefs who constructed more village schools and brought about greater long-run 
development.
Consistent with Olson (1993) theory of “stationary bandits”, the stable, within-
village nature of bengkok rents could also have attracted chiefs whose incentives are 
more aligned to those of their villages and who are more inclined to invest in 
productive village assets. This seems counterintuitive: a large literature shows that 
landowners and political elites are typically unwilling to provide public goods such as 
schools (Bates, 2014; Acemoglu et al., 2007), given potential increases in wages and 
reductions in land rents. The key difference is institutional: bengkok chiefs are 
constrained in the prices at which they can sharecrop or lease out bengkok land. 
Qualitative fieldwork reveals that prices are often tied down by traditional agreements 
and hence, given fixed costs, bengkok chiefs, unlike traditional landlords, would have 
had less of an incentive to withhold investments in public goods.
This study contributes to the political economy of development literature in 
a number of ways. First, it contributes to the literature on (pre-)colonial 
political institutions and long-run economic development. Appointed by 
hereditary rule or empowered to collect taxes without accountability mechanisms, 
local leaders in many parts of the developing world today continue to capture local 
public goods and civil society, leading to worse development outcomes (Acemoglu et 
al., 2014; Anderson et al., 2015; Banerjee and Iyer, 2005). In contrast, I show that local 
leaders empowered through land rents can have positive effects on long-run 
development. Despite initial motives for increasing extraction, persistently higher land 
rents for village chiefs outlived the Dutch. These rents, together with Dutch-instituted 
elections, created a robust mechanism for the positive selection of local leaders and 
alignment of incentives that continue to have positive effects on development today.
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Second, this study contributes to a largely theoretical literature on the effects of
political pay on the selection and performance of politicians and bureaucrats (Besley,
2005; Dal Bó and Finan, 2018; Besley, 2004). A smaller empirical literature focuses
on the effects of changes in compensation of municipal legislators across one or two
election terms (Ferraz and Finan, 2009; Gagliarducci and Nannicini, 2013). Another
growing strand of literature studies the effects of career incentives on bureaucrat
performance in India (Bertrand et al., 2018). In contrast, the persistent survival of
bengkok allows me to study the effects of higher rents on rural political economy and
development outcomes across three decades of modern Indonesian history. Furthermore,
my results suggest that bureaucratic compensation of village chiefs, executives situated
at the lowest rung of the state administrative ladder, can be as, if not more, important
for determining long-run development outcomes.
Relatedly, I provide insight towards an old debate on how (the lack of) incentives
affects whether (dis-)honest individuals choose to run for public office. A recent
experimental literature shows that the old adage that “you can’t get rich in politics
unless you’re a crook” continues to ring true: In low income countries with high levels
of corruption, dishonest university students are more likely to want to enter publice
service (Banerjee et al., 2015; Hanna and Wang, 2017). In high income countries with
low levels of corruption, however, honest university students are more likely to want
to enter (Barfort et al., 2015). I do not measure honesty but my real-world findings
bridges the gap between the two, and shows that higher rents within a low income
country can potentially shift local political economy into a high income country
equilibrium. Higher rents consistently attract more competent politician-bureaucrats
who, given better development outcomes, are arguably less dishonest.
Third, this study contributes to a growing economic literature that studies the
role of village chiefs in local development (Baldwin, 2013, 2016; Basurto et al., 2017;
10
Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2013; Henn, 2019). In a closely related study, Casey 
et al. (2018) tests the efficacy of three randomized control trials designed to increase 
own-village development capacity by encouraging younger, more educated villagers to 
participate in village development. The authors find that the probability of winning 
development projects is increasing in the participation of more educated villagers. 
More educated villagers, however, are typically sidelined by older, less educated 
traditional chiefs. My findings suggests that, instead of working around traditional 
chiefs, increases in chief remuneration could be equally effective in improving village 
development capacity through attracting more highly educated and skilled individuals 
to run for village office.
Finally, I contribute to a nascent literature on the economic history of Southeast 
Asia (Dell and Olken, 2017; Dell and Querubin, 2017; Dell et al., 2018; Paik and 
Vechbanyongratana, 2019). Here, I innovate by designing and collecting data through 
an original survey. This gives me the unprecedented flexibility to study the inner-
workings of village institutions from a bottom-up perspective. Furthermore, lessons 
from traditional governance in Indonesia have broad external validity for developing 
countries everywhere: many aspects of traditional governance in Africa are a direct 
result of colonial experience in Asia (Mamdani, 1997); and many aspects of traditional 
governance in India are similar to Indonesia given British rule over Java. What 
distinguishes the Indonesian colonial experience is the granting of rents to chiefs 
together with the institution of democratic elections; colonial powers in Afria and India 
did not grant stable rents and typically appointed local leaders to hereditary positions. 
Hence, my findings suggest that the introduction of both stable within-village rents 
and regular elections could lead to long-lasting, positive effects on economic 
development.
     In the next section, I describe the role of village chiefs in Indonesia, with an
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emphasis on their role as key intermediaries between the villager and the state. 
Section 3 provides a brief account of Dutch expansion of tanah bengkok and presents
the empirical strategy. In Section 4, I introduce my survey data and auxilliary data 
sources. Section 5 presents my main findings on downstream chief performance and 
development outcomes. Section 6 disentangles selection from re-election incentives. 
Section 7 discusses alternative explanations and Section 8 concludes.
1.2 Background: Village Chiefs and Tanah Bengkok in Indonesia
Village elections are a two-century old institution in Java. Introduced by Raffles, 
Governor General during the British interregnum in the early nineteenth century,
the institutionalization of local chief elections distinguishes colonial Java from other 
colonial settings. Why did the British do this on colonial Java? Historical evidence 
suggests that village elections were introduced to strengthen the legitimacy of local 
chiefs as tax collectors (Bastin, 1954; Bosma, 2013; Holleman, 1981). The designation
of local chiefs as tax collectors over regional Javanese lords was also a strategic choice: 
colonizers were reluctant to grant more power to regional Javanese lords lest they 
threaten colonial rule.4
Introduction of elections and taxation duties was never accompanied by a commensurate 
increase in remuneration. Chiefs were never formally incorporated into the bureaucratic 
state but were instead paid in terms of bengkok land or a wide variety of levies
in money, produce or labor (Husken, 1994) depending on pre-existing institutions
and practices. Much of these rewards for local governance arose during the Dutch
Cultivation System when chiefs were made responsible for the organization of local
land and labor for the forced cultivation of export crops. In particular, given heavy
4The choice of who to designate as local tax collector was made even more difficult due to the fact
that the British could not find a clear equivalent to landlords as in the Zamindari system instituted
in much of British India. See Banerjee and Iyer (2005) for an economic analysis of the legacy of the
Zamindari system.
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financial costs of paying the salaries of tens of thousands of chiefs, the conversion
of rice fields into tanah bengkok were sanctioned by the Dutch (Breman, 1983) and
the geographical incidence of tanah bengkok and differences in land rents continue
to follow historical borders. In Section 3, I outline my empirical strategy and how I
exploit these cross-border differences.
1.2.1 Chief Elections: Term Length and Campaign Costs
The persistent practice of electing village chiefs was a direct result of low managerial
capacity of the Dutch colonial state (Breman, 2016), and contrasts sharply with
other colonial settings where chiefs derived sole legitimacy from colonial authorities
(Abraham, 2003).5 The key difference between chief elections pre and post-Indonesian
independence, however, lies in term length. Under colonial rule, chiefs were elected
for life. The 1979 Village Law amended this, stipulating that chiefs were to be elected
to fixed terms of 6-8 years for a maximum of two terms each.6
Ethnographical evidence suggests that the robustness of local elections were
highly varied (Antlöv, 1994). A number of sources have documented State interference
in the screening of candidates before elections are permitted to take place during the
New Order period (1965-1998) (Antlöv et al., 1995). In contrast, villagers today have
greater freedom to vote for the candidate of their choice without district interference
(LLI3 Study, 2012: 68 – 82). Regardless, village elections are frequently described as
festivals of democracy (Husken, 1994): the entire election process takes less than thirty
hours during which selection of candidates are announced, speeches held, campaigning
starts and ballots are cast and counted in the village hall.
5Note that my analysis throughout this study refers to desa’s or rural villages where village
heads are elected by popular vote and not kelurahan’s or urban villages in which village heads are
appointed. In contrast, for example, Martinez-Bravo (2014) studies the effects of differences in
political leanings between desa and kelurahan chiefs.
6This changed in 2017. Today, chiefs are technically allowed to run for a third time given that
they step-down a year before the third election is scheduled to take place.
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Preparations, however, often begin months before election day, and it is well-known
that running for the chief position is one of the most expensive ventures in village
society. From my fieldwork, respondents report a mean campaign cost of 22 million
Indonesian Rupiah (IDR) ($1,466) and, in particularly fierce contests, campaign costs
can reach as high as 400 million IDR ($26,667). Actual, itemized expenditures are
highly varied but a large amount is spent on preparing meals, coffee, snacks and
cigarettes for an endless stream of visitors. In certain cases, it entails “pocket money”
for voters and the sponsoring of local events and festivals both before and after election
day. In my study region, respondents report having to sponsor post-election fishing
festivals: one candidate reported a purchase of 100kg of ikan gurame, a popular local
fish, to celebrate his electoral success with voters.
Running for chief is also a highly calculated bet. Many candidates borrow heavily
to finance campaign expenditures, and there is a real risk of bankrupty from losing
elections. Election losses can lead to financial disaster and the fire-sale of both land
and property (Husken, 1994). Similarly, we have encountered numerous occasions
where our questions on campaign costs led to hushed whispers about neighbors that
lost everything upon losing an election.
1.2.2 Chief responsibilities and remuneration today
Village chiefs bear a heavy responsibility as both agents of the state and elected
representatives of a social community, maintaining responsibilities and allegiances
with his fellow villagers (Antlöv, 1994). As agents of the state, chiefs are expected
to supervise development projects, maintain regular contacts with higher authorities,
and handle issues of security and politics at the village level. As elected representatives,
chiefs are expected to collect informal taxes and settle disputes and grievances amongst
villagers.
Yet, despite these responsibilities, chiefs are not paid a living wage and the
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majority of chief remuneration is derived from traditional bengkok land rights. Based
on my survey data, bengkok chiefs earn an average of 34.4 million Indonesian Rupiah
(IDR) ($2,293) per year, about 3 times more than non-bengkok chiefs who earn 12.2
million IDR ($813) per year. The bulk of this comes from bengkok land with a
negligible fraction from intra-village (rice) taxes levied on the population. Regardless,
both bengkok and non-bengkok chief remuneration remains relatively low: The average
annual salary of an Indonesian civil servant is 23.4 million IDR ($1,560)7 and the
average annual wage of a day laborer is 18 million IDR ($1180) (BPS 2019).
Despite low remuneration, village chiefs play an important role in affecting the
level and quality of village development. Chiefs are the only tier of government in
constant, direct contact with villagers. Hence, despite their lowly positions at the
bottom of a long chain of command,8 a good chief can bring development to his
village through two channels: Top-down lobbying and bottom-up management of
development projects.9
First, the competence of village chiefs and their connections with upper levels
of government play an important role in securing additional public goods (Evers,
2000). This was especially true during the last decades of Suharto-era rule in the
1990s when discretionary project funding replaced structured development grants:
the village chief became a central figure in attracting project funding from the central
and provincial government (von Benda-Beckmann and von Benda-Beckmann, 2013).
The main channel through which this occurred was the informal and formal lobbying
of upper-level government agencies.10 More recently, the importance of lobbying
7Author’s calculation from the 2010 Indonesian Work Force Labor Survey.
8Indonesia has four main tiers of government: provinces, districts, subdistricts, and villages.
9Part of the discussion in this section is based on Evers (2000) and Martinez-Bravo (2017). See
Martinez-Bravo (2017) for a detailed discussion of the mechanisms behind public good provision at
the village level.
10Evers (2000) writes:“One village head explained it as follows. ”It’s a matter of dropping in
frequently on heads of the important government agencies. If you’re lucky, you may show up just
when decisions are being made about new projects. In this manner I’ve managed to obtain a number
15
has increased. Following decentralization in 1999, districts have not become more
proactive in the disbursement and monitoring of funds to villages. Rather, “access to
district resources (continues to) depend on village capacity, rather than supporting
it” (LLI3 Study, 2012). In short, lobbying and connections of chiefs to supra-village
officials remains as, if not more, important than ever in accessing top-down funds.
Second, the ability of chiefs to raise local revenue is an important determinant
of final project quality (Martinez-Bravo, 2017). Both in the absence of and in 
conjunction with supra-village government support, additional informal taxes or 
community cash contributions (Swadaya, Gotong Royong) are a well-documented 
source of funds and labor for village projects (Antlöv et al., 1995; Evers, 2000; Olken 
and Singhal, 2011; Raffles, 1830). Higher own-village investment can, in turn, lead to 
both higher levels and quality of public goods (Evers, 2000).
1.3 Empirical Strategy
This section presents the historical experiment and empirical strategy illustrating how 
Dutch expansion of bengkok allows me to identify the effects of higher rents. 
Throughout, I discuss and address main identification concerns.
1.3.1 Pre-Colonial Roots and Determinants of Adopting Bengkok
The practice of tanah bengkok is rooted in the agrarian Indo-Javanese kingdom of 
Mataram – the last native kingdom to rule Java before the expansion of Dutch colonial 
rule in the early 19th century. Literally translated as ”crooked land”, tanah bengkok 
refers to cultivation rights over village rice land that was granted to local notables for 
political loyalty and services. Pre-colonial rule, these rights were typically expanded 
with the extension of Mataram rule over Java (Maurer, 1994; Moertono, 2009), and the 
correlation between bengkok rights and Mataram rule is still visible in contemporary
of projects for my village without ever paying a bribe or having to promise a kickback.”
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village census data. Figure 1·1 plots the size of village-level bengkok land in 2000 and
the largest bengkok land continues to be concentrated in Central and East Java – the
historical centre of the Mataram kingdom. This poses a challenge for identification of
the causal effect of bengkok land rents today: stronger pre-colonial kingdom rule may
have an impact on traditional local leadership in these areas that I cannot control
for.
A second potential source of bias is pre-existing rice fertility and geographical
elevation. Bengkok takes the form of village rice land, hence villages with more fertile
rice land typically award chiefs with larger swathes of bengkok land (Maurer, 1994).
Given that rice is a staple food crop in Indonesia, higher rice fertility could lead
to better outcomes for reasons that have nothing to do with bengkok land. Bengkok
practices are also inversely related with elevation: higher altitudes are associated with
lower rice fertility and hence, smaller bengkok land.
1.3.2 Exogenous Assignment from Dutch Expansion in West Java
I circumvent these concerns by focusing on a region in West Java of present-day
Indonesia that was homogenous until the beginning of the ninteenth century when
it was split into two Dutch administrative units assigned with different systems
of chief remuneration. This region was placed under Dutch sovereignty in 1700
and, under a strict policy of non-interference, had a shared political, religious and
administrative history in terms of a unified legal and taxation system (Hoadley, 1994).
Importantly throughout this time, the Dutch had not yet extended their control down
to the villages and there was little village administration and no history of bengkok
throughout this region (Antlöv et al., 1995; Breman, 2016).
It was only in the early ninteenth century that colonial attempts to enforce and
streamline village administration began. In 1808, with little knowledge about the
interior of Java, the Dutch divided the region into two parts – Priangan in the East
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and Cirebon in the West – following salient geographical features of mountains and
rivers.
Shortly after, the end of the Belgian War in 1831 led to an urgent need for a
new source of revenue (Van Niel, 1972). This led to the imposition of the Dutch
Cultivation System (1832-1870) across the entire Java where local villagers were
forced to grow export crops under the supervision of local village chiefs. A lack
of colonial manpower, however, meant that Dutch authorities had to work within
pre-existing local institutions and constraints (Van Niel, 1972). A key institution that
the Dutch were aware of were traditional bengkok rights for chiefs in central Cirebon
but not elsewhere in Cirebon nor Priangan (Figure 1·3). Hence, in order to facilitate
extraction, the Dutch imposed tanah bengkok practices everywhere across Cirebon
but not in Priangan. Dutch missives and regulations suggest that the differential
introduction of bengkok land was enforced due to the self-proclaimed importance
of respecting existing local customs of bengkok that existed in Cirebon but not in
Priangan (Raffles, 1830; Fernando, 1982). Notably, this was despite the border
between the two regions (henceforth refered to as the Priangan-Cirebon border) being
extremely mountainous and unsuitable for the cultivation of wetland rice and, by
extension, the practice of tanah bengkok.
To see that the historical expansion of tanah bengkok did indeed conform to the
Priangan-Cirebon border, Figure 1·4 illustrates the border in black and green and
the extent of tanah bengkok land at the sub-district level using 1867 Dutch archival
data.11 The expansion of bengkok appears to align almost exactly with the extent
11The 1867 Eindresume is a historical land cadastre of 808 villages in Indonesian Java conducted
by the Dutch colonial government in 1867 and contains the earliest records of bengkok land. The
purpose of the survey was to determine the direction of colonial policy due to liberal Dutch opposition
against the continued exploitation of natives through the Cultivation system (Eindresume Vol I,
1867 pp 3-6). All land under private estates were excluded. This refers to land sold by the Colonial
Government to the European and Chinese. Most of this land was centered on the North Coast of
West Java (present-day Cirebon) and Surabaya in East Java (Kano, 1904). Surveyors were advised
to select at least 2 villages in each district (roughly equivalent to present-day subdistricts) with a
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Given that most of the  Priangan-Cirebon border closely followed rivers and 
mountain ranges, I further limit my sample to two segments of the southern Priangan 
Cirebon border  where villages are balanced on elevation.  Figure 1.2 plots the two 
segments of my study border and the contemporary size of bengkok across the Priangan-
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of theborder and, despite imprecision of colonial statistics at that time, there is a
markeddiscontinuity inbengkok acrosstheborder.
A related concern is that there could have been historical di↵erences inDutch
colonial policy across the Priangan-Cirebon borders. Indeed, historical evidence
suggests that crop cultivation systems were di↵erent acrossmost of the Priangan-
Cirebonborder:theDutchgrewco↵eeinPrianganandsugarthroughoutCirebon.To
circumvent this, I focus on the southern segment of the Priangan-Cirebon border
where historical records suggest that co↵ee, and not sugar, was grown along the
Cirebon borders. Indeed,FigureA.1 clearly shows that no sugarwas grown in the
south ofCirebon.Why thenwas bengkok introduced in southCirebon despite the
cultivationofco↵ee?ArchivalworksuggeststhatthiswasduetoDutchobsession in
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segments of my study border and the contemporary size of bengkok across the Priangan-Cirebon
borders. Moving across the borders, there is a marked discontinuity in bengkok
size. There have, however, been increases in bengkok in Priangan compared to 1867
(Figure 1·4). This can been seen in the northwestern corner of Figure 1·2 where
villages in Priangan have substantial amounts of bengkok land today. Fieldwork
suggests, however, that these increases in bengkok came about after Dutch colonial
rule. Typically, this adoption of bengkok land occurred when a rich villager passed on
preference for those that were as distinct from each other as possible.
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and pledged his rice land towards payment of village government officials. It could
also take place if village elders or officials came together to purchase rice land for the
same purpose. In other cases, villages received funds from supra-village government
officials to purchase bengkok land. In sum, these increases in bengkok were relatively
less uniform then under Dutch rule. Given positive amounts of bengkok land across
both sides of the border, this motivates a spatial fuzzy regression discontinuity design.
1.3.3 Spatial Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity Design
Following Basten and Betz (2013), I estimate a spatial fuzzy regression discontinuity
(RD) across the Priangan-Cirebon border. The fuzzy RD design exploits the fact
that the incidence of bengkok does not jump from zero to one at the border. Instead,
the causal effect of bengkok is identified by instrumenting the size of bengkok with the
indicator for whether a village belonged to the historical Cirebon region and hence,
was assigned bengkok in 1830.
In a fuzzy RD estimation framework, I estimate the following specification using
ordinary least squares (OLS) and instrumental variables (IV):
civbt = α + γ bengkokv + f(geographic locationv) + φb + Soehartot +Xv β + εivbt,
(1.1)
where civtbt is the outcome variable of interest for candidate i in village v at time
t located along segment b of the Priangan-Cirebon administrative boundary. In the
OLS specification, bengkokv is the size of bengkok land in village v and in the IV
specification, this is instrumented by Cirebonv an indicator equal to 1 if village v
is located in Cirebon Residency and equal to 0 otherwise. f(geographic locationvd)
is an RD polynomial which controls for smooth functions of geographic location.
φb is a set of boundary segment fixed effects that denote each of the north and
south segments of the study boundary and Soehartot is an indicator that equals one
20
if the village election took place during the Soeharto dictatorship. Xv is a vector
of time-invariant covariates for village v. In my baseline specification, I control
for predetermined geographical characteristics of elevation and slope shown to be 
important determinants of bengkok and results are robust to excluding these controls.
The main coefficient of interest is γ: the effect of higher land rents from an increase 
in 1 hectare of bengkok land. Under the assumption that Dutch Cirebon rule only affects 
outcomes via its effect on bengkok, the IV estimate of γ identifies
the causal effect of bengkok land on downstream outcomes. Notably, under a Local 
Average Treatment Effect (LATE) framework the IV estimates isolates the effects of 
marginal bengkok land endowed under the Dutch. Given low population density at that 
time, it is plausible that this land would have been more productive than the marginal 
bengkok land endowed in later periods. This is important for understanding
differences between OLS and IV results presented later.
For outcomes on chief performance and development, I estimate village and 
individual-level outcomes analogous to equation (1.1) with two differences. For village-
level outcomes, I include (survey-)year indicators and individual level controls for 
individual-level outcomes. Since village-level unobservables are likely to be spatially 
correlated, I report standard errors corrected for arbitrary spatial correlation and allow 
for spatial dependence of an unknown form (Conley, 1999). I use a cut-off window of 
30kms and, in the Online Appendix, I further show that these results are largely robust 
to alternative cut-off windows and the clustering of standard errors at the village-level.
In terms of bandwidth selection, I limit my analysis to observations within 30 km,
20 km and 10km of the Priangan-Cirebon border. This leaves me with 193 sample 
villages within a 30km bandwidth. I calculated the optimal Imbens-Kalyanaram 
bandwidth for my main outcomes with distance to the border as the running variable. 
The optimal bandwidth was generally between 5 and 10 km depending on the outcome.
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For villages in Cirebon to be an appropriate counterfactual for those in Priangan,
all relevant factors besides treatment have to vary smoothly at the Cirebon-Priangan
Residency boundary before the introduction of Dutch tanah bengkok in Cirebon, i.e.
before 1830. An important covariate is pre-treatment economic prosperity. This
is important given that, if the Dutch simply introduced bengkok in areas that had
higher pre-existing prosperity, differences in post-treatment outcomes could simply
be a reflection of this and not differences in bengkok. To test this, I use 1819 Dutch
population records collected from Dutch colonial archives in Indonesia. Unfortunately,
these population records are aggregated and reported only for the largest village
located within each sub-district, a larger administrative unit. Hence, to construct
measures consistent with present-day administrative boundaries, I match 1819 village
names to contemporary village locations. I then divide population by the size of
sub-districts and, in this way calculate measures of population density for 24 
contemporary sub-districts. The reported mean in Table 1.1 shows that in 1819 the entire 
Priangan-Cirebon border region was sparsely populated with an average population 
density of 0.24 persons per ha.12 Estimates imply that, if anything, the Cirebon region 
where bengkok was imposed was less sparsely populated before Dutch intervention.
In Table 1.2, Panel A, I test for jumps in important geographic characteristics
of elevation, slope and ruggedness. The first three columns shows that elevation is
statistically identical across the Cirebon-Priangan residency boundary except within
the 10km bandwidth where Cirebon villages are of slightly higher elevation. This is
consistent with historical evidence discussed above: the introduction of bengkok was
done in a haphazard manner that ignored actual geographical suitability for bengkok.
Regardless, I control for elevation in all my regressions and results are robust to the
exclusion of elevation as a control. Next, I look at differences in slope and terrain
ruggedness. All differences remain small and statistically insignificant except for
12Average population density today in the Priangan-Cirebon region is around 10 persons per ha.
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ruggedness for villages within 30km where Priangan villages are marginally more 
rugged.
In Panel B, I further test for differences in crop suitability in terms of percentage 
soil with poor drainage and proxies for rice and coffee fertility using FAO-GAEZ 
potential yield data. Rice is a staple food crop and, as discussed, rice fertility is
a strong determinant of bengkok incidence and size outside of my study region. I 
further test for differences in coffee fertility as a proxy for Dutch extraction given that 
coffee was the main cash crop grown in my study region. Again, across variables and 
specifications, there are no large differences except on potential yield for wet rice that 
is, on average, 3 kilograms lower in Cirebon villages. Relative to a mean of 2154 
kilograms, however, this is not a meaningful difference.
In sum, I find balance on important predetermined geographical characteristics 
and crop suitability, suggesting that villages on either side of my study border are 
comparable.
1.4 Data
To examine the effects of higher land rents on political selection and economic 
development, I collect original survey data and combine this with various rounds of the 
Indonesian Village and Population Census data. Here, I provide details on core 
regressors and outcomes. I introduce other outcomes of interest as they arise.
1.4.1 Original Survey Data
Between January - May 2019, I design and conduct an original survey of village chiefs
to record the oral and written history of village establishment, chief characteristics, 
and chief and village income for all post-1979 elections in 193 villages within 30km
of the southern Priangan-Cirebon border. As discussed above, 1979 marked the 
implementation of the 1979 Village Law which introduced regular chief elections.
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The final dataset comprises detailed biographical information on all chief candidates
who ever ran for village office including education, occupation, land ownership, chief
ancestry, vote shares, campaigning costs, term length, and completion.
In particular, data on education and occupational characteristics comprises 931
chiefs and the entire candidate pool of 2,297 candidates from 1979 - 2014. I also
collect qualitative data on how tanah bengkok functions in each village: the size of
bengkok awarded to chiefs, mode of cultivation, the reason behind the choice of system,
the number of leasors or sharecroppers and actual harvest income. Finally, I collect
quantitative data on (in-)formal tax collection, development projects and qualitative
information on how chiefs obtain funds for projects. My dataset substantially improves
upon existing data with detailed information on characteristics of each election-term
period and information on the entire candidate pool. Existing data on chief elections
is limited to education and age of chiefs starting from the 1986 Indonesian village
census and number of years a chief has been in office in the 1992, 2000 and 2003
census rounds.
Prior to implementation, I conduct in-depth qualitative fieldwork and pre-testing
of questionnaires, entirely in the Indonesian language, jointly with AKATIGA foundation,
an Indonesian NGO with extensive experience in rural poverty studies. This was
done to determine how best to elicit responses to sensitive questions. I work with
qualified locals as enumerators who, for the duration of the survey, residd in each
village, and in interviews, all enumerators tried to simulate a ”conversation about
village oral history”. We target 5 respondents per village and, to the best of our
ability, interview all past and present village chiefs, currently alive, with quantitative,
historical recall questionnaires embeded in qualitative interviews. If a chief was no
longer alive or unable to communicate, we interviewed village elders or officials who
were alive during that chief’s rule and familiar with his rule. In this manner, 33.5%
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of sample respondents are past or present village chiefs.
1.4.2 Measuring Village Development and Chief Performance
To examine the bengkok system’s impact on contemporary development outcomes
and chief performance, I use various rounds of the Indonesian Village Census and the
100% count 2010 Indonesian Population Census and georeference outcomes to the
village-level. Crucially, the 100% count population census provides information on
education and health outcomes in all my sample villages. This is important because
the geographical concentration of my sample limits usage of other survey modules
with more detailed measures of education and health.
My main measures of chief performance are village revenue and public goods
provision. To measure these, I merge eleven different waves of the triennial Indonesian
Village Census (Potensi Desa) collected between the years 1983 and 2014.13 Conducted
by the Central Bureau of Statistics, Indonesia, the village census covers the entire
country and comprises a large number of measures of public goods provided in the
village, such as infrastructure, health and educational facilities.14. Across waves, the
village census has a different focus (agriculture, economy, or population) and several
variables are not reported consistently across years. Hence, I focus on public good
outcomes that are reported consistently across different waves of the survey.
1.5 Results
This section presents my main empirical results in two stages. First, I present
first-stage results, linking historical Dutch intervention to bengkok prevalence today.
13In particular, these waves correspond to the years 1983, 1986, 1990, 1993, 1996, 2000, 2003,
2005, 2008, 2011 and 2014.
14As discussed in Martinez-Bravo (2016), survey enumerators collect answers from members of the
village administration and are expected to check these answers against village administrative records
and through physical, on the ground, surveys. Since measures of public goods such as the number
of schools and health facilities are easily verifiable, this survey provides an accurate representation
of public goods in all villages.
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Second, I present my main results on economic development and chief performance. I
defer discussion of mechanisms to Sections 6 and 7, where I layout evidence consistent
with historically positive political selection and rule out alternative explanations.
1.5.1 First Stage
Table 1.3 and Figure 1·5 presents first stage results of the average size of bengkok
land under chief control. I report estimates as follows: Across columns in Table 1.3,
I demonstrate robustness of results to bandwidth choice by presenting results for
observations within three bandwidths of 30km, 20km and 10km. Following Gelman
and Imbens (2017), I use a linear polynomial in latitude and longitude of each
village as my baseline specification in Panel A and report robustness to the use
of a cubic polynomial in distance to the border and cubic polynomial in latitude
and longitude in Panel B and C. Given the small N nature of my study, however, a
cubic polynomial in latitude and longitude results in substantially noiser results but
reassuringly, coefficient magnitudes remain largely the same.
Across columns in Table 1.3, Panel A, Cirebon villages have 1.36 to 1.48 more
hectares of bengkok land. The use of a cubic polynomial in distance and latitude,
longitude leads to slightly larger point estimates in Panels B and C. As expected,
a cubic polynomial in latitude and longitude leads to noisier estimates of the jump
in bengkok at the border but reassuringly, magnitudes remain stable across all three
polynomial specifications.
The jump in discontinuity of bengkok across the border can be seen graphically in
Figure 1·5 which plots the actual data alongside predicted values. Here in Figure 1·5
the left subfigure plots the actual size of bengkok land and the right subfigure plots the
predicted values of bengkok land. Figure 1·5 shows clearly that the predicted size of
bengkok changes discontinuously at the border. Taken together, these results testify
to the strong persistence of differences in bengkok practices since their introduction
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almost 200 years ago in 1830 and suggests that IV estimates using a linear polynomial
in latitude and longitude do not suffer from a weak instruments problem.
1.5.2 Main Outcomes
In this section, I estimate the effects of bengkok land rents on chief performance and
contemporary development outcomes. I find that higher bengkok rents lead to the
collection of both higher external and internal village revenue, and the construction
of more public goods in terms of contemporary infrastructure facilities and historical
village schools. Remarkably, positive effects from public goods accrue to the entire
village. Bengkok villages continue to be better developed today across measures of
economic activity, health, and education. For all outcomes, I continue to present
results for observations within three bandwidths of 30km, 20km and 10km across
columns but present results only for my baseline specification of a linear RD polynomial
in latitude and longitude of each village. I present key robustness checks along the
way, including to alternative RD polynomials, but defer mechanisms and further
robustness checks to Section 6 and 7.
1.5.3 Public goods provision
Table 1.5 examines the effects of higher land rents on public goods provision from
1983 to 2011.15 Following Martinez-Bravo (2017), I construct standardized z-score
measures of three types of public goods provision per capita – infrastructure, health
and education. To isolate the effects of chief effort, I examine public goods that are
more susceptible to village governance (Lewis, 2016; Martinez-Bravo, 2017). Hence,
I construct a z-score for infrastructure by taking standardized, per capita averages of
three indicators for whether the main village road is passable by a 4-wheel vehicle,
15Given that public goods measures are not consistently reported across village census years, I use
measures from 1983, 1986, 1993, 2003, and 2011 which reports consistent measures of infrastructure,
health, and education.
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whether the village has access to safe garbage disposal, and whether the village has 
safe drinking water as measured by access to tap water or a water pump. I construct 
a z-score for health public goods by taking standardized, per capita averages of 
the sum of health posts, supplementary health posts and trained doctors in each 
village. I construct a z-score for education public goods by taking standardized, per 
capita averages of the number of kindergartens, primary schools and junior secondary 
schools. I omit anything above the junior secondary level as the construction and 
management of these schools are almost always under the control of external 
government offices.
Higher land rents from bengkok lead to positive effects on infrastructure public 
goods but no differences in health public goods. There is also a negative effect on 
education public goods. Columns (1) to (3) examine effects on infrastructure public 
goods and implies that a 1 hectare increase in bengkok land rents leads to 0.14 to 0.22 
s.d. higher infrastructure public goods. As a benchmark, Martinez-Bravo (2017) finds 
that each additional year of district exposure to Soeharto-era mayors is associated 
with a decrease of 0.047 s.d. in education public goods per capita. Next, columns (4) 
to (6) examine effects on health public goods and find small and insignificant 
differences in health public goods. In the remaining columns of (7) to (9), higher 
bengkok land rents leads to 0.08 to 0.14 standard deviations less educational public 
goods.
Why do bengkok villages today have fewer educational public goods despite earlier 
discussion on positive historical selection of chiefs and local village schools? This is 
because contemporary educational public goods measures do not distinguish between 
schools constructed by top-down government intervention and those constructed through 
local chief efforts. In Indonesia, large-scale central government school construction 
efforts,  or  INPRES,  between  1973  and  1978  sought  to  equalize  primary  schooling
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access, with the number of government schools constructed inversely related to existing
pupil enrolment (Duflo, 2001). This suggests that lower educational public goods
provision in bengkok villages today are almost surely a result of higher villager education
and more local village schools constructed before top-down government intervention.16
To investigate this, I use the 1983 village census to reconstruct the number of
central government INPRES schools and non-INPRES village schools. For comparison
with results in Table 1.5, I construct a standardized z-score average of INPRES and
non-INPRES schools. Indeed, in Table 1.6, columns (1) - (3) reveal that less INPRES
schools were constructed in bengkok villages and columns (4) - (6) implies that more
non-INPRES village schools were constructed. I.e. Results on fewer contemporary
educational public goods in Table 1.5 are driven by the construction of fewer top-down
INPRES schools. Fewer top-down INPRES schools were constructed in bengkok
villages because there were a larger number of existing own village schools.
Large positive results on village schools are important for two reasons. First, in
the absence of school construction by Dutch colonial authorities and the pre-INPRES
Indonesian state, the presence of village schools are strongly suggestive of greater
village school construction efforts led by village chiefs. Typically involving the pooling
of contributions from land-owners or market taxes (Aritonang, 1994; Djajadiningrat,
1940), greater school construction efforts are indicative of the ability of village chiefs to
win the trust of villagers and build consensus between different stakeholders. Second,
in the absence of top-down intervention, greater village school construction is a pure
outcome of bottom-up village capacity and rules out differential top-down provision as
16Similarly, Dell and Olken (2017) finds evidence of higher historical villager education in villages
forced to cultivate sugar under the Dutch Cultivation System. There, however, the channel is through
greater construction of village schools on larger plots of village-owned land induced by redistribution
of village land for forced sugar cultivation. This possibly took place to a lesser extent in my study
region given that coffee, and not sugar was the main export crop grown in the Priangan-Cirebon
area. Coffee was typically grown outside of villages in the highlands. In contrast, sugar is typically
grown inside villages directly alongside rice fields.
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an alternative explanation. Together, this is suggestive of bengkok land rents exerting
a historically positive effect on political selection of chiefs who were more effective
at historical school construction. I investigate this possibility in Section 6.1. when
discussing mechanisms.
1.5.4 Village Transfers
To construct public goods, chiefs can lobby for external revenue from government
sources or raise internal revenue through informal taxation of villagers. In Table 1.7,
I investigate the extent to which chiefs are able to leverage both channels using all four
rounds of village census data in 1996, 2003, 2008, and 2011 that report the amount
of revenue received by villages in the previous fiscal year. To account for possibly
meaningful content of zeroes, I apply an inverse hyperbolic sine transformation to the
amount of external and internal village revenue received by villages.
In Table 1.7, coefficients across columns (1) - (3) imply that an increase in 1
hectare of bengkok is associated with 0.15 to 0.19 higher external village revenue.
Crucially, however, the ability to obtain higher external revenue does not come at the
expense of internal revenue. Columns (4) to (6) show that there is a similar positive
effect of bengkok land rents on internal revenue. Taken together, these results suggest
that chiefs are more effective at raising funds from both top-down and bottom-up
sources.
Positive effects on bottom-up funding are informative: fieldwork suggests that
chiefs who have the trust and support of villagers are typically more successful at
raising informal revenue for the construction of public goods. In turn, public goods
constructed from a greater proportion of internal village revenue might be of higher
quality if villagers are more invested in the maintenance of these facilities (Evers,
2000).
Despite greater infrastructure and historical educational public goods provision,
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it is unclear if increases in public goods provided by chiefs necessarily translates into 
improvements in overall development outcomes. Much of the development literature 
highlights how benefits from public goods often remain concentrated among political 
elites (Hoffman et al., 2017). Hence, in the next section, I investigate the effects of 
higher rents on contemporary development outcomes.
1.5.5 Contemporary development
Do increases in public goods translate into better economic development? I investigate
the effect of land rents on measures of contemporary development in terms of nighttime 
light intensity, the percentage of deceased children, and years of education. The effects
of nighttime light intensity are estimated at the village-level, and the latter two at
the individual-level controlling for cohort fixed effects and gender.
Nighttime light intensity is from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(see Henderson et al. (2012), for details) and is increasingly used to proxy for income
in studies exploiting highly localized identifying variation (e.g., Michalopoulos and 
Papaioannou (2013)). I use all available years of nighttime light intensity from 1992
to 2011 as my main measure of overall economic development at the village level.
I apply an inverse hyperbolic transformation to account for zeros. The percentage
of deceased children and years of education is constructed from the 2010 Indonesian 
population census. Percentage of deceased children is a proxy for child mortality 
where, for each women who ever gave birth to a child, I use the difference between
the number of children ever born and the number of children still alive to construct
the percentage of deceased children. To obtain a better proxy for recent village health 
conditions, I restrict the sample to all women of recent child-bearing age at the time of 
enumeration. I.e. All women aged between 20 to 35 years or born between 1975-1990.
I complement this by constructing years of education of all individuals aged 20 to 35.
I present estimates on village-level economic development in Table 1.4. In Panel
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A, I begin with estimates of nighttime light intensity. The estimates in Panel A
implies that bengkok villages have higher economic activity as proxied by nighttime
light intensity. This is consistent with positive effects on infrastructure in columns (1)
- (3) of Table 1.5. It it also consistent with a sizeable literature that shows how greater
road construction is associated with greater market access and economic prosperity
(Gollin and Rogerson, 2014). Together with positive results on village revenue, chiefs
compensated by higher land rents might be more effective at gathering funds or
lobbying for the construction of village roads. In turn, this has positive downstream
effects for the entire village.
Panel B shows that bengkok villages have 0.6 percentage points fewer deceased
children relative to a mean of 2.4 percentage points in spite of no effects on health
infrastructure in columns (4) to (6) of Table 1.5. This can be reconciled by the fact
that childbirth and important medical care continues to take place outside villages.
Within-village health posts are rarely staffed by adequately trained personnel and
women have to be transported to hospitals in towns or cities with adequate medical
equipment. In transportation of women to towns or cities, roads are likely to play
a greater role and lower proportion of deceased children possibly reflects better
within-village infrastructure as shown in columns (1) - (3) of Table 1.5.
Finally, panel C reports estimates for contemporary years of education of all
villagers born between 1975-1990. Across columns, villagers have 0.17 to 0.23 more
years of education relative to a mean of 6.5. These small but positive effects on
education stand in contrast to negative effects on educational public goods in columns
(7) - (9) in Table 1.5, but are consistent with better ability of chiefs to raise internal
funds from villagers in Table 1.7. As discussed in Section 2.2., schools constructed
from a greater proportion of internal revenue might provide villagers with a higher
quality of education compared to schools constructed entirely from top-down, external
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funding. Positive effects on contemporary education of villagers are also consistent
with intergenerational spillovers from higher education of earlier villager birth cohorts
(Figure 1·6, discussed later in Section 6.1.).
Key Robustness Checks In Appendix Table A.2 - A.7, I show that results on
contemporary development outcomes in Table 1.4 are robust to a range of alternative
RD polynomial specifications and the inclusion of a range of controls. For controls,
I run equation (1.1) including predetermined village-level agricultural controls (rice
potential yield and coffee potential yield), geographic controls (ruggedness, drainage),
and measures of ease of access to upper levels of external government (distance to
sub-district and district capital). Controlling for measures of access to upper levels
of external government is particularly important given possible concerns that villages
might receive more funds simply because they are located geographically closer to
administrative centres of external government.
Appendix Table A.2, A.3, and A.4 reports robustness of main results to alternative
RD specifications. For comparison, the top row of each table reports estimates from
the baseline specification. First, I vary the degree of the polynomial in the running
variable (latitude and longitude) in equation (1.1). My main results are largely
robust to alternative polynomials (quadratic, and cubic). As discussed, the use of a
cubic polynomial results in substantially noisier estimates, but reassuringly coefficient
magnitudes remain largely similar. Second, I vary the running variable and, instead
of a polynomial in latitude and longitude, use a cubic polynomial in distance to the
colonial border. The RD specification remains positive and significant.
Appendix Table A.5, A.6, and A.7 reports results from equation (1.1) with
sequential addition of agricultural, geographic and distance to external government
controls in each panel. Again, for comparison the top row reports results from
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my baseline specification in Table 1.4. Reassuringly, my findings are robust to the
inclusion of these controls.
Overall, my results suggest that persistently higher land rents from bengkok
continue to cause better chief performance today, as measured by village revenue
and public goods construction. The benefits of positive chief performance accrue to
the entire village. Villages where chiefs receive higher bengkok land rents remain
richer and more developed even today. In the next section, I disentangle mechanisms
and present results consistent with higher bengkok land rents improving performance
by persistently attracting higher quality chiefs. I do not find any evidence for stronger
re-election incentives.
1.6 Mechanisms
Why do higher land rents lead to better chief performance? This section examines
and disentangles two mechanisms commonly discussed in the empirical literature on
political pay and performance (Ferraz and Finan, 2009; Gagliarducci and Nannicini,
2013): because higher land rents attract better quality chiefs (political selection), or
because, seeking re-election, higher rents incentivizes chiefs to put in greater effort
(re-election incentives).
Given the persistence of bengkok land rents over nearly two centuries, I investigate
both historical and modern-day mechanisms. Overall, I find evidence consistent with
persistently positive political selection starting from as early as the 1920s. I do not
find any evidence for stronger re-election incentives both historically and today. This
provides further evidence for the importance of political selection over re-election
incentives and is consistent with evidence from Gagliarducci and Nannicini (2013).
There, the authors study the effects of higher wages on the performance of Italian
mayors, and using term limits to disentangle selection from incentives, do not find a
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role for re-election incentives in driving better mayoral performance.
1.6.1 Historically Positive Political Selection
Prior to 1979, chiefs were elected for life. Hence, in the absence of re-election
incentives, any positive outcomes of chief effort that I observe prior to 1979 is almost
surely a result of positive political selection. Given that I do not have direct measures
of chief quality, I test for historical political selection by turning to two measures of
historical educational provision: historical village school construction and villager
education. Educational provision is an important indicator of chief effort given the
complete absence of top-down school provision up till the late 1970s (Aritonang,
1994; Djajadiningrat, 1940). The late 1970s marked the beginning of INPRES, a
massive school construction program in Indonesia which largely equalized primary
school access and was funded entirely through central government transfers (Duflo,
2001).
I begin in Table 1.6 by looking at the presence of schools in 1983, one of the
earliest dates for which village level data on different types of schools are reported
in the Indonesian village census. The data breaks down primary schools into those
constructed through top-down, INPRES goverment transfers and those constructed
through bottom-up, village chief efforts. Columns (1) - (3) focuses on INPRES schools
and show that bengkok villages received if anything fewer INPRES schools. This is
almost surely an indicator of greater villager education before the 1970s given that
INPRES schools were targeted based on pre-existing availability of primary education
(Duflo, 2001). Indeed, columns (4) - (6) focuses on non-INPRES schools and report
that an increase in 1 hectare of bengkok land is associated with 0.15 to 0.4 standard
deviations higher village schools constructed.
I dig deeper into effects on historical villager education by using the 100% count
sample of the 2000 Population Census to estimate cohort-level regressions. Following
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Dell and Olken (2017), I estimate equation (1.1) beginning with the cohort born
between 1920 and 1930, and ending with the cohort born between 1975 and 1980,
the youngest cohort to have completed formal education by 2000. Figure 1·6 plots
cohort-level coefficient estimates from equation (1.1). Impacts on years of education
are large and positive across all cohorts. In particular, cohorts born in 1920 who
completed their education in the complete absence of top-down school provision by
the Dutch, have 1.2 more years of education relative to a mean of 3.6 years. These
effects decrease somewhat across time but are still present in the most recent cohorts.
Taken together, positive impacts on historical school construction and villager
education are indicative of the timing of effects of higher bengkok land rents. In the
absence of re-election incentives, higher bengkok land rents attracted higher quality
chiefs who were better able to lead historical school construction efforts. Positive
effects of school construction efforts extend to entire villager cohorts who continue to
be more educated even today. In the next section, I investigate the extent to which
selection vis-a-vis re-election incentives continue to play a role in driving positive chief
performance today.
1.6.2 Modern-Day Political Selection on Education and Occupation vs
Re-Election Incentives
Using original survey data, this section disentangles political selection from re-election
incentives. I show that higher land rents attract higher quality candidates, as measured
by education and previous occupation, but these effects disappear once I account for
average villager education. Together with evidence of historically positive political
selection, these results suggest that strong positive political selection in the past
cumulatively raised the average education of the entire village population such that
bengkok candidates today, despite being more educated and drawn from better occupations
compared to their non-bengkok counterparts, are not more highly educated or elite
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compared to the average bengkok villager.
I then turn to re-election incentives. After 1979, chiefs today are no longer elected
for life but to fixed terms of 6-8 years each. I do not find, however, any evidence that
higher bengkok rents lead to stronger re-election incentives. Bengkok chiefs are if
anything less likely to re-run for elections. Instead, I find evidence for selection along
a different margin: bengkok rents attract chiefs who are less orientated towards the
interests of elites and more towards that of their fellow villagers.
Candidate Quality: Education & Previous Occupation Table 1.8 estimates
the effect of bengkok land rents on the education of village chief candidates. Across
columns (1) - (3), a 1 hectare increase in bengkok land leads to an increase in the
average years of education of the candidate pool by 0.15 to 0.35 years relative to a
mean of 11 years. Given the average duration of high school education in Indonesia
is 12 years, this suggests that bengkok candidates are marginally more likely to be
high school graduates.
Table 1.9 examines effects on occupational selection. Specifically, I look at three
main categories of previous occupation constructed from the survey question, “What
was the previous occupation of each chief (candidate)?”. In this manner, I classify
candidates who prior to running for elections held a high wage occupation, was a
civil servant, or held a low wage occupation.17 Accordingly, results in Table 1.9 are
presented as follows: In columns (1) - (3) the dependent variable is an indicator
for whether the candidate held a high skilled occupation, in columns (4) - (6) the
dependent variable is an indicator for whether a candidate was an ex-civil servant
and finally, in columns (7)-(9) the dependent variable is an indicator for whether a
17Note that these three occupational categories are not mutually exclusive owing to the difficulty
of classifying occupations. For example, a large portion of my sample consists of traders (pedagang)
who might plausibly be classified as medium or low wage. I do not classify these occupations and
they remain outside of my analysis.
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candidate held a low skilled occupation pre-election.
Before we move to results in Table 1.9, it is useful to understand how formal
compensation from the village chief position compares with compensation from the
closest outside options. The average annual remuneration of a bengkok chief in my
sample with 2.8ha of bengkok land rights is 34.4 million Indonesian Rupiah (IDR)
($2,293), roughly three times more than a non-bengkok chief who earns 12.2 million
IDR ($813). In comparison, the average annual salary of an Indonesian civil servant
is 23.4 million IDR ($1,560)18 and the annual wages of a day laborer is 1 million IDR
($700) (BPS 2019). Overall, annual compensation of an average bengkok chief in my
sample is substantially higher than that of a civil servant, but compensation of an
average non-bengkok chief is equivalent to that of a day wage laborer.
Higher land rents attract a larger share of ex-civil servants. Across columns in
Table 1.9, an increase in 1 hectare of bengkok land leads to a 1.9pp to 3.6pp increase
in the share of chief candidates from a civil service background. Notably, there are
no differences in the share of chief candidates from high or low wage occupations.
Taken together, these results suggest that candidates are being selected exactly from
the middle-end of the skill-wage distribution. This is exactly what we would expect
given prevailing wage differentials outlined above.
In Table 1.10, I report effects of bengkok land rents on education of village
chiefs. I.e. Only election winners. Estimates are positive but fall short of statistical
significance across columns except for column (1). These ambiguous effects of higher
land rents on the quality of elected politicians compared to positive effects on the
entire candidate pool, are consistent with political economy models such as Dal Bó
and Finan (2018). It also suggests that elected chiefs might be selected based on
other traits, a possibility that I explore in Section 6.3.
18Author’s calculation from the 2010 Indonesian Work Force Labor Survey.
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Are candidates more selected compared to the average villager? Table
1.11 estimates analagous candidate-level equations by subtracting average villager
education from the education of candidates. I measure villager education at the
village-level from the 100% count 2010 Indonesian population census and define
average villager education as the education of all villagers aged 25 to 70 years old at
the time of census enumeration. Before we look at estimation results, the mean of the
dependent variable is informative. Chief candidates have, on average, 4 more years
of education compared to the average villager. Given that the average villager has 6
years of primary education (Table 1.4, Panel C), this implies that candidates on both
sides of the border are highly selected with 10 years of education (junior high school).
Remarkably, in a very different context, Thompson et al. (2019) finds that candidates
who ran for Congress in the 1940s have 4.38 more years of education compared to
members of the public.
Across columns (1) to (3), however, Table 1.11 implies that, despite overall
positive selection of candidates compared to the average villager, higher land rents
have no effect on differences in education between candidates and the average villager
today. Together with earlier positive results on historical selection, the absence of
modern-day selection is not surprising. Persistently higher land rents from bengkok
caused historically positive selection of chiefs. Historically selected chiefs were so
effective at constructing schools and providing education for villagers such that both
villagers and candidates today are more highly educated. As a result, we no longer
observe positive selection today. This is also consistent with improvements in outside
options over time. Given the lack of increases in chief remuneration, interest in the
village chief position could have decreased with increasing urbanization and opening
up of the Indonesian economy since the 1980s (Antlöv, 1994).
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Re-Election Incentives Since 1979, chiefs are no longer elected for life but are 
subject to recurring elections every 6-8 years. Given the possibility of re-election, 
Table 1.12 examines to what extent better chief performance is a result of higher 
bengkok land rents inducing chiefs to put in greater effort in a bid to get re-elected. 
Columns (1) to (3) presents results for the effect of land rents on the probability 
that an incumbent chief chose to re-run for office. Effects are small and statistically 
insignificant and if anything are somewhat negative. In fact, across all villages, only 
18% of all incumbent chiefs choose to re-run for office. This is extremely low compared 
to other contexts.19 Columns (4) to (6) estimate effects on the probability that 
an incumbent chief is re-elected conditional on re-running. Re-election rates are 
somewhat higher for bengkok chiefs and all chiefs, on average, have a 46% chance of 
re-election conditonal on re-running.
Though somewhat puzzling, the lack of re-election incentives despite high re-election 
rates are consistent with findings from qualitative fieldwork. Respondents frequently 
cite long term lengths and the insufficiency of chief compensation as a primary reason 
for their reluctance to re-run for office. First-hand accounts from fieldwork illustrate 
the disparity between compensation and duties: “As village officials, we serve villagers 
round-the-clock. Back then, when we didn’t have streetlights, I frequently had to walk 
in darkness to the village office to write letters for villagers.” In another account, a 
son of an ex-village chief recalled how their family frequently ate cassava without any 
rice and, before his death, his father banned all members of his family (diharamkan) 
from running for the village chief position on account of the low compensation and 
hardship that the family faced during his term of office.
Together, these results suggest that higher bengkok land rents cause positive 
chief performance through historically positive effects on selection and not stronger
19On average, 66% of Italian mayors rerun for a second term and 78% are re-elected (Gagliarducci 
and Nannicini, 2013). In Brazil, 75% of municipal legislators re-ran for a second term and 40% were 
re-elected (Ferraz and Finan, 2009).
40
re-election incentives. Historically positive effects on selection were so strong that we
no longer see contemporary positive political selection on education nor occupation.
Persistently positive effects of higher land rents despite the absence of re-election
incentives are particularly interesting: they undermine the importance of elections as
a disciplining tool (Gagliarducci and Nannicini, 2013), and suggest that the use of
elections as a selection mechanism in the presence of higher political pay might be
sufficient to ensure good performance of politicians.
Given persistently positive development outcomes and the lack of modern-day
selection on education, occupation, and re-election incentives, I turn to another
margin of selection suggested as important by the stable, within-village nature of
bengkok rice land and qualitative ethnographic fieldwork: the orientation of chiefs
away from elite interests.
1.6.3 Modern-Day Selection on Orientation Away from Elite Interests
As a proxy for orientation away from elite interests, I examine the probability that
villages vote for Golkar, the party of Soeharto, the longest-standing ruler of Indonesia,
in the 1999 legislative elections. The 1999 elections is notable for being the first
democratically held elections after the end of Soeharto’s rule in 1998. Hence, given
well-documented evidence that chiefs were made to turn out the vote for Golkar during
the Soeharto era, and persistence of party machinery that helped Golkar carry the
vote in 1999, voting against Golkar is a plausible indicator of chief independence of
elite interests both during and after Soeharto’s rule.
In the absence of individual-level vote counts, I construct an indicator that
equals 1 if Golkar obtained first place in the 2000 village census. Across columns
(1) - (3), Table 1.13 implies that an increase in 1 hectare of bengkok leads to a
10.5 to 18.4p.p. decline in the probability that Golkar obtained first place in a
village. Together with evidence that land rents from bengkok led to consistently
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positive development outcomes, voting against the authoritarian party suggests that
the stable, within-village nature of bengkok rents attracted chiefs who are less oriented
towards supra-village government and village elite interests. In turn, these chiefs
were more likely to act in the best interests of the village both during and after
authoritarian rule. This is consistent with Olson (1993) theory of “stationary bandits”:
a stake in local village land attracted chiefs who are more oriented towards village
interests and were more likely to invest in productive village assets.
1.7 Alternative Explanations
I have argued that the main driver of positive development outcomes is selection
arising from higher bengkok land rents. This section provides additional evidence to
support this interpretation by considering and ruling out several leading alternative
explanations.
1.7.1 Moonlighting
One possibility is that stable compensation from bengkok land rents simply freed
up time for chiefs to perform their duties. Better performance of bengkok chiefs is
a result of having more time to, for example, lobby for funds and public goods.
Non-bengkok chiefs perform worse in office because of the need to moonlight or
supplement insufficient chief compensation through working a second job. I investigate
this possibility in Table A.1 by estimating the effect of bengkok land rents on the
probability that a chief reported having held a second job while in office.20 It is
important to note, however, that these are self-reported measures and might be biased
if chiefs who receive lower compensation are less willing to report having held a second
20This question covers all 339 past or present chiefs who were still alive at the time of our survey
and whom we interviewed. We did not ask about second job status of other chiefs given time
constraints.
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job while in office. Hence, I also report estimates for the probability that a chief
refused to answer when asked whether he had a second job.
Indeed, 23% of chief respondents refused to answer this question. Columns (1) -
(3) of Table A.1, however, show that chiefs who receive lower compensation are not
more likely to refuse to answer. In addition, columns (4) - (6) show that an additional
hectare of bengkok land is, in fact, associated with a 10p.p. increase in the probability
that a chief had a second job while in office. This suggests that bengkok chiefs are not
performing better because land rents from bengkok frees up their time for political
office. Instead, these results are in line with the plausibly positive selection of chiefs
of higher ability as evidenced by enterprises that were too lucrative to give up in spite 
of being elected as chief. Conversely, non-bengkok chiefs, being of lower ability, are less 
likely to have had lucrative enterprises or jobs worth holding onto once they are 
elected to office.
1.7.2 Intermediate Colonial Extraction and Infrastructure Policy
Dutch rule over most parts of Java lasted from 1830 - 1945 and during this time the 
Dutch enforced forced cultivation of crops from 1830 - 1870. After the abolition of 
forced cultivation in 1870, the latter half of Dutch colonial rule was characterized by a 
more liberal, “ethical policy”. Throughout both periods, however, Dutch 
administrative units were largely under the control of the Dutch central government 
and lacked individual autonomy to decide on policy for their own regions. 
Nevertheless, given that the expansion of bengkok rights stemmed from motives of 
colonial extraction, differed across a historical colonial border, and evidence that 
Dutch investments in infrastructure elsewhere in Java continue to have effects on 
development today (Dell and Olken, 2017), I examine differences in colonial extraction 
and infrastructure across my study border and show that my results are robust to 
accounting for these differences.
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The Dutch collected extensive data during the colonial era but most of these
are only available at an aggregated level. To obtain measures of extraction and
infrastructure at the village-level, I turn to 1853 and 1945 Dutch maps (Appendix
Figure A.2). which I digitize and overlay over modern-day village boundaries. 1853
maps show coffee cultivation and road infrastructure. Forced coffee cultivation was
abolished in 1870 and hence, 1945 maps no longer show cofffee cultivation. Instead,
1945 maps show road and rail infrastructure. For 1853 maps, I calculate the percentage
of village land that was covered by village settlements, the percentage of village land
covered by coffee plots, and road density at the modern-day village polygon level. For
1945 maps, I calculate road and rail density at the modern-day village polygon level.
Table A.8, Panel A presents results for 1853 measures while Panel B presents
results for 1945 measures. Across measures, the percentage of village land settled
is higher within 10km (column (3)) and both coffee cultivation and road density is
significantly higher across all three bandwidths. Given the lack of village autonomy
at this time, these results suggest that, at the height of forced cultivation in 1853,
there was greater Dutch extraction in Cirebon compared to Priangan, and this was
accompanied by the construction of more roads for the transportation of coffee produce.
The pattern of higher infrastructure largely reverses by 1945. In Panel B, both
road and rail density in 1945 is negative all throughout Cirebon except within 10km
of the border where road density remains higher. The reversal of infrastructure
provision suggests that, with the end of forced cultivation, central Dutch colonial
policy largely equalized and reversed any advantages in infrastructure stemming
from colonial extraction across my study borders. Given the uneven differences in
extraction and infrastructure across time and space, however, I formally test for the
robustness of my key findings by including these measures as controls.
Appendix Table A.9, A.10, and A.11 reports results from equation (1.1) controlling
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for differences in colonial administrative policy. Again, for comparison the top row 
reports results from my baseline specification in Table 1.4. Reassuringly, my findings 
are robust to the inclusion of these controls. Overall, there is little evidence that 
differences in colonial administrative policy are responsible for the differences in 
contemporary development that we observe today. This provides further support 
for the mechanisms highlighted in Section 6: higher bengkok land rents attracted 
better quality leaders who exhibit better performance in office.
1.7.3 Differential Top-Down Provision of Public Goods
The historical colonial border continues to live on as a modern-day district administrative 
border. Hence, another concern is that differences across my study borders could be 
driven simply by differences in top-down provision of public goods or funds disbursed 
by external district governments. Qualitative fieldwork, however, suggests that there 
were no differences in the extent to which district governments disbursed public goods 
to my sample villages. Respondents commonly cite the need for village chiefs to visit 
external village government offices to ask or lobby for funds and public goods, without 
which, there would not be any village development. This is reflected in my survey 
data where 75% of all development projects constructed by chiefs were reported to 
have been obtained through chief lobbying efforts.
To the best of my knowledge, there is no pre-existing data source that tracks 
the amount of funds or public goods disbursed by district governments to individual 
villages. As a proxy, I instead investigate the possibility of differential top-down 
provision using detailed modern-day intercity and local roads data in Table A.12. 
Intercity and local roads are a key public good whose provision and maintenance 
typically fall under the direct purview of provincial (intercity) or district governments 
(local roads). Hence, the presence of intercity and local roads is a plausible proxy 
for top-down provision of public goods. Notably, the provision of these roads are
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entirely separate from village roads provided through bottom-up village chief efforts
as explored in Table 1.4, and are much less susceptible to the influence of village
governments. Furthermore, intercity and local roads are main thoroughfares that
typically connect rural villagers to neighboring towns and urban centres. Hence, any
differences in provision might plausibly have direct effects on modern-day development
outcomes.
Columns (1) - (3) and (4) - (6) shows that there are no statistically significant
differences in intercity nor local roads provision across my study borders today. In fact
if anything, bengkok villages have less intercity roads. These results demonstrate that
any pre-existing differences in colonial infrastructure policy have been ameloriated by
the modern Indonesian state, and despite being under the jurisdiction of different
district governments, there is no evidence of differential top-down provision of public
goods today.
1.8 Conclusion
In conclusion, I provide novel micro-level empirical evidence for the efficacy of paying
chiefs higher land rents based on rights to a stable, within-village income generating
asset. In contrast to the large literature that emphasizes the extractive nature of
traditional local governance, I document a rare case where the strengthening of local
chief authority did not lead to worse outcomes. This is striking given that the award
of bengkok land took place during one of the most extractive colonial enterprises in
history.
Using original survey data, I show that the key to positive economic development
here was the use of higher rents to office in the context of robust local elections.
This led to historically positive selection of local leaders. These leaders constructed
more village schools in the distant past and this has persistently positive effects on
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long-run development with both villagers and candidates today being more educated.
The within-village nature of bengkok land is likely to be important. Similar to Olson
(1993)’s theory on stationary bandits, the provision of higher rents through control
over a within-village income-generating asset appears to have strengthened the chief
position and attracted chiefs who are less beholden to supra-village elite interests
(lower probability of voting for Golkar). In turn, these chiefs were more likely to
invest in village development.
Last, my findings have direct implications for development policy. In Indonesia,
under the 2014 Village Law Fund (Undang-Undang Dana Desa 2014 ), villages today
receive direct transfers of US$70,000 to village bank accounts for development purposes,
broadly construed. My findings suggest that recent, concommitant increases in and
the provision of a stable compensation for village chiefs are a step in the right
direction. My research also highlights benefits that might accrue if attempts to raise
the salary of village chiefs in India and Africa succeed (Times of India, 2012; Daily
Monitor, 2016) and provides conditions under which such measures might be effective.
1.9 Figures and Tables
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Figure 1·1: Bengkok Land in each village, 2000 (ha)
Figure 1·1: This map plots the size of tanah bengkok land, at the village-level,
across the entire island of Java, Indonesia. The Priangan-Cirebon border is
highlighted in dark blue. In particular, I study villages along the southern
Priangan-Cirebon border where villages have similar historical crop cultivation
patterns. I zoom in on this portion of the map in Figure 2 below
Figure 1·2: Bengkok Land in each village, 2000 (ha)
Figure 1·2: This map plots the size of tanah bengkok land, at the village-level,
across my study borders. Given the mountainous geography of this region, I restrict
my study sample to villages across two segments of this border where there are no
discontinuities in elevation. Hence, in grey, are villages not included in my study. In
white, are mountains where no village settlement exists. Urbanized towns and cities
are omitted given that settlements in these areas are organized under a different
system and chiefs are not awarded bengkok land.
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Figure 1·3: Bengkok Land in Priangan-Cirebon, Pre-1830
Figure 1·3: This map plots the geographical spread of bengkok before Dutch
expansion in 1830. The institution was only known in central Cirebon pre-1830.
Figure 1·4: Average Bengkok Land in each Village, Sub-District Level
1867 (ha)
Figure 1·4: This map plots the size of tanah bengkok land, at the
subdistrict-level, across my study borders from 1867 Dutch archival
data.
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Figure 1·5: First-Stage RD Graph






































Longitude is on the x-axis, latitude is on the y-axis, and the data
value is shown using an evenly-spaced monochromatic color scale.
Figures on the left show actual data values plotted at the village-level.
Figures on the right show predicted values, for a finely spaced grid of
longitude-latitude coordinates, from a regression of the size of bengkok
land on an indicator for being on the Cirebon side of the border using
equation (1).
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Figure 1·6: Cohort-Level Differences in Years of Education of
Villagers Across the Bengkok Boundary
Source: Census 2000 data. Regressions estimated at the
individual-level and pooled at 5 year cohort-levels. First cohort pooled
at 10-year level (1920-1930) for power. Bars plot 95% confidence
intervals.
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Table 1.1: Balance on Pre-Treatment Population Density, 1819
1819 Population Density
sample within: 30 km 20 km 10 km
(1) (2) (3)
cirebon border =0.139 =0.178* =0.177**
(0.132) (0.084) (0.067)
Observations 24 20 17
Mean Dep. Var 0.24 0.25 0.26
Note: Unit of observation is at the sub-district level measured in terms of persons
per hectare. Source: 1819 Dutch archival records. Regressions include border
fixed effects. In successive columns, I limit the sample to include only villages
located less than 30km, 20km, and 10km from the historical Cirebon-Priangan
Residency boundary. Conley standard errors for difference in means between
Cirebon and Priangan villages are in brackets (assuming a cut-off window of
30km).
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 1.2: Pre-Determined Geographic Characteristics
Panel A: Geographic Characteristics
Elevation Slope Ruggedness
sample within: 30 km 20 km 10 km 30 km 20 km 10 km 30 km 20 km 10 km
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
cirebon border =25.252 10.451 41.253***1.511 0.567 =0.864 0.046* 0.004 =0.012
(43.610) (26.721) (15.658) (3.647) (3.279) (2.282) (0.028) (0.030) (0.018)
Observations 193 164 103 193 164 103 193 164 103
Mean Dep. Var 459.38 480.41 443.03 24.76 24.94 27.15 0.18 0.16 0.14
Panel B: Drainage & Potential Crop Yield
Drainage Wet Rice Coffee
Potential Yield Potential Yield
sample within: 30 km 20 km 10 km 30 km 20 km 10 km 30 km 20 km 10 km
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
cirebon border 0.042 0.019 =0.004 3.845 0.798 =3.131***=0.441 0.261 =2.448
(0.036) (0.035) (0.003) (3.270) (2.787) (1.190) (1.384) (1.292) (1.568)
Observations 164 137 81 193 164 103 193 164 103
Mean Dep. Var 0.73 0.84 0.94 2152.87 2155.18 2154.88 623.71 623.43 619.53
Note: Unit of observation is village-level. I include border fixed effects. Geospatial
measures of elevation, slope and drainage are calculated using data at 30 arc
second (1km) resolution (SRTM (2000)). Meaures of potential agricultural yield
are calculated using FAO-GAEZ data. All measures calculated at 2000 village
border polygons. The unit of measure for elevation is meters; slope is degrees;
drainage is percentage of land covered by soils with poor or excessive drainage; wet
rice and coffee potential yield in tons per hectare. In successive columns, I limit
the sample to include only villages located less than 30km, 20km, and 10km from
the historical Cirebon-Priangan Residency boundary. Conley standard errors
for difference in means between Cirebon and Priangan villages are in brackets
(assuming a cut-off window of 30km).
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 1.3: First Stage: Jumps in Size of Bengkok Across Historical Border, Border
RD
Sample Within: 30 km 20 km 10 km
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Linear Polynomial in Latitude and Longitude
cirebon border 1.362*** 1.437*** 1.487**
(0.478) (0.526) (0.596)
Panel B: Cubic Polynomial in Distance
cirebon border 1.644*** 1.669*** 1.669***
(0.388) (0.400) (0.461)
Panel C: Cubic Polynomial in Latitude and Longitude
cirebon border 1.589* 1.602* 1.465
(0.923) (0.961) (1.289)
Observations 191 162 101
Mean Dep. Var 1.64 1.87 2.01
Note: Unit of observation is at the village level. Outcome in column (1) - (3) is
the average size of bengkok land awarded to the elected chief as reported in our
survey data. Controls: Village-level mean elevation, slope and border segment
fixed effects. Conley standard errors allowing for spatial autocorrelation within
cutoff of 30km is used.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 1.4: Contemporary Development Outcomes: Fuzzy RD
Sample Within: 30 km 20 km 10 km
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Nighttime Light Intensity, IHS
bengkok 0.114* 0.165*** 0.208***
(0.060) (0.046) (0.054)
Observations 3820 3240 2020
Mean Dep. Var 2.18 2.32 2.49
First Stage F Statistic 13.0 14.0 9.5
Panel B: % Children Died
bengkok =0.63*** =0.58*** =0.47***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 21709 17947 11027
Mean Dep. Var 2.4 2.4 2.2
First Stage F Statistic 14.9 13.2 9.4
Panel C: Years of Education, Villagers
bengkok 0.208** 0.177*** 0.233***
(0.090) (0.050) (0.065)
Observations 204189 173744 113862
Mean Dep. Var 6.50 6.55 6.67
First Stage F Statistic 12.8 11.6 7.8
Note: Panel A: Unit of observation is at village-year level. Outcome in columns
(1) - (3) is nighttime light intensity, inverse hyperbolic sine transformed. Controls:
Village-level mean elevation, slope, year and border segment fixed effects. Panel B:
Unit of observation is at individual level. Outcome is constructed from the number of
dead children as a proportion of total children ever born reported by each women who
was recorded as having ever given birth in the 2010 Indonesian Population Census. To
better approximate current-day health conditions, I restrict the sample to all women
born between 1975-1990. These are women who would have been 20-35 years of age at
the time of enumeration of the 2010 census and of prime child bearing age. Controls:
Village-level mean elevation, slope, 5-year cohort and border segment fixed effects.
Panel C: Unit of observation is at individual level. Outcome is the number of years
of education as reported in the 2010 Indonesian Population Census. For comparability
with health outcomes in Table 3, I restrict the sample to all individuals born between
1975-1990. Controls: Identical to Panel B. Conley standard errors allowing for spatial
autocorrelation within cutoff of 30km is used
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
55
Table 1.5: Contemporary Public Goods Provision: Fuzzy RD
Infrastructure Z-Score Health Z-Score Education Z-Score
Per Capita Per Capita Per Capita
Sample Within: 30 km 20 km 10 km 30 km 20 km 10 km 30 km 20 km 10 km
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Instrumental Variables
bengkok 0.229***0.188***0.141** 0.032 0.027 =0.021 =0.083***=0.143***=0.113**
(0.064) (0.056) (0.056) (0.050) (0.073) (0.081) (0.030) (0.034) (0.052)
Observations 945 802 499 946 803 499 946 803 499
Mean Dep. Var 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00
First Stage F Statistic 12.9 13.9 9.0 12.9 13.9 9.0 12.9 13.9 9.0
Note: Source: Village Census (PODES) data. Pooled regressions at tri-annual
podes level for all available village census years between 1983 to 2014. All Z-scores
calculated using per-capita measures. Infrastructure z-score includes 3 indicator
variables which equal 1 if the village has a road passable by 4wd vehicle, if the
village has safe garbage disposal, or if the village has safe water. Health: number
of health posts posyandu, supplementary health posts and number of doctors.
Schools: Kindergartens, (non-)religious primary and junior high schools Controls:
Village-level mean elevation & slope, survey-year and border segment fixed effects
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 1.6: Historical Public Goods Provision, Fuzzy RD
Z-Score Schools, 1983
INPRES Non-INPRES
Sample Within: 30 km 20 km 10 km 30 km 20 km 10 km
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Instrumental Variables
bengkok =0.167 =0.135 0.052 0.406*** 0.226*** 0.153**
(0.105) (0.089) (0.077) (0.145) (0.064) (0.075)
Observations 188 160 100 188 160 100
Mean Dep. Var 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00
First Stage F Statistic 11.7 12.2 7.4 11.7 12.2 7.4
Note: Source: 1983 Village Census (PODES) data. Unit of observation is at the
village level. Outcome in columns (1) - (3) is the standardized per capita z-score
of number of INPRES schools in the village. Outcome in columns (4) - (6) is the
standardized per capita z-score of number of non-INPRES village schools. Smaller
N is due to difficulty in merging historical village census data with modern-day
villages. Controls: Village-level mean elevation, slope and border segment fixed
effects. Conley standard errors allowing for spatial autocorrelation within cutoff
of 30km is used.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 1.7: Village Revenue: Fuzzy RD
Village Revenue, IHS
Supra-Village Intra-Village
Sample Within: 30 km 20 km 10 km 30 km 20 km 10 km
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Instrumental Variables
bengkok 0.191*** 0.142*** 0.155*** 0.341*** 0.277*** 0.219***
(0.037) (0.040) (0.045) (0.086) (0.060) (0.053)
Observations 764 648 404 764 648 404
Mean Dep. Var 11.34 11.35 11.39 11.84 11.85 11.89
First Stage F Statistic 12.7 13.6 9.1 12.7 13.6 9.1
Note: Unit of observation is at the village level. All variables are inverse hyperbolic
sine-transformed. Outcome in column (1) - (3) is the amount of funds that a
village reports having received from Central, Provincial and District governments.
Outcome in column (4) - (6) is the amount of funds that a village reports having
received from internal village sources such as village own taxes. Source: Village
census 1996, 2003, 2008 and 2011. Controls: Village-level mean elevation, slope,
survey-year and border segment fixed effects. Conley standard errors allowing for
spatial autocorrelation within cutoff of 30km is used.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 1.8: Candidate Quality: Education (1979-2014), Fuzzy RD
Years of Education
Sample Within: 30 km 20 km 10 km
(1) (2) (3)
Instrumental Variables
bengkok 0.356*** 0.241*** 0.155*
(0.068) (0.063) (0.089)
Observations 2136 1769 1103
Mean Dep. Var 10.89 10.95 11.06
First Stage F Statistic 22.70 20.30 11.05
Note: Unit of observation is at the village chief candidate level. Outcome in column
(1) - (3) is the number of years of education received by a village chief candidate
that ran for office between 1979 - 2014, from survey data. Controls: Village-level
mean elevation, slope, indicator if election took place before 1999 and border
segment fixed effects. Conley standard errors allowing for spatial autocorrelation
within cutoff of 30km is used.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 1.9: Candidate Quality: Occupation (1979-2014), Fuzzy RD
High Wages (Ex-)Civil Servants Low Wages
Sample Within: 30 km 20 km 10 km 30 km 20 km 10 km 30 km 20 km 10 km
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Instrumental Variables
bengkok 0.001 0.010 0.011 0.036***0.017** 0.019** 0.013 0.007 0.013
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0.007) (0.008) (0.013) (0.014) (0.009)
Observations 2204 1821 1137 2204 1821 1137 2204 1821 1137
Mean Dep. Var 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.21 0.22 0.21 0.23 0.23 0.23
First Stage F Statistic 22.5 21.2 11.9 22.5 21.2 11.9 22.5 21.2 11.9
Note: Unit of observation is at the village chief candidate level. All outcomes
are coded from previous occupations of all chief candidates that ever ran for
office between 1979 - 2014 from survey data. Outcome in column (1) - (3) is an
indicator for whether the candidate held a high wage occupation which includes
occupations like businessman, rice paddy huller and equivalent. Column (4) -
(6) is an indicator for whether the candidate was previously a career bureaucrat
(PNS ) Column (7) - (9) is an indicator for whether the candidate held a low
wage occupation such as day-wage (farm) laborers. Controls: Village-level
mean elevation, slope, indicator for whether election took place before or after
1999 democratization and border segment fixed effects. Conley standard errors
allowing for spatial autocorrelation within cutoff of 30km is used.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 1.10: Chief Characteristics: Education, Fuzzy RD
Years of Education, Chiefs (1979-2014)
Sample Within: 30 km 20 km 10 km
(1) (2) (3)
Instrumental Variables
bengkok 0.318*** 0.143 0.057
(0.111) (0.154) (0.191)
Observations 873 735 456
Mean Dep. Var 11.07 11.14 11.21
First Stage F Statistic 22.2 22.9 13.9
Note: Unit of observation is at the village chief level. Outcome in column (1)
- (3) is the years of education received by each village chief that ran for office
between 1979 - 2014 from survey data. Controls: Village-level mean elevation,
slope, indicator if election took place before 1999 and border fixed effects. Conley
standard errors allowing for spatial autocorrelation within cutoff of 30km is used.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 1.11: Candidate Characteristics: Differencing out Average Village Education,
Fuzzy RD
Differences in Years of Education
Sample Within: 30 km 20 km 10 km
(1) (2) (3)
Instrumental Variables
bengkok 0.073 =0.015 =0.061
(0.094) (0.090) (0.104)
Observations 2136 1769 1103
Mean Dep. Var 3.98 4.01 3.98
First Stage F Statistic 22.7 20.3 11.1
Note: Unit of observation is at the village chief candidate level. Outcome in column
(1) - (3) is the years of education received for each village chief candidate that
ran for office between 1979 - 2014 from survey data substracted by average years
of education in the candidate’s village for individuals aged 25-70 from Census
2010 data. Controls: Village-level mean elevation, slope, indicator if election
took place before 1999 and border fixed effects. Conley standard errors allowing
for spatial autocorrelation within cutoff of 30km is used.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 1.12: Re-Election Incentives: Fuzzy RD
=1 if Incumbent
Re-Ran For Office Was Re-Elected
Sample Within: 30 km 20 km 10 km 30 km 20 km 10 km
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Instrumental Variables
bengkok =0.024* =0.002 =0.006 0.061** 0.067** =0.028
(0.012) (0.019) (0.014) (0.025) (0.033) (0.027)
Observations 906 763 471 170 150 84
Mean Dep. Var 0.18 0.19 0.17 0.46 0.47 0.44
First Stage F Statistic 20.7 22.0 13.4 45.1 39.5 23.1
Note: Unit of observation is at the village chief level. Outcome in column (1) - (3)
is an indicator variable that equals 1 if an incumbent chief re-ran for office in the
next immediate election term. Outcome in column (4) - (6) is an indicator variable
that equals 1 if an incumbent chief re-ran and won in the next immediate election
term. Source: Original survey data. Controls: Village-level mean elevation, slope,
an indicator for whether the election took place before 1999 and border segment
fixed effects. Conley standard errors allowing for spatial autocorrelation within
cutoff of 30km is used.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 1.13: Orientation towards Elite Interests: Voting for Golkar in 1999, Fuzzy
RD
Sample Within: 30 km 20 km 10 km
(1) (2) (3)
Instrumental Variables
bengkok =0.184*** =0.146** =0.105**
(0.052) (0.057) (0.053)
Observations 191 162 101
Mean Dep. Var 0.32 0.29 0.30
First Stage F Statistic 12.2 13.0 8.4
Note: Unit of observation is at the village level. Outcome in column (1) - (3) is
an indicator that equals 1 if Golkar received the most number of votes in 1999,
the first elections after the end of Soeharto’s rule in 1998. Source: 2000 village
census data. Controls: Village-level mean elevation, slope and border segment
fixed effects. Conley standard errors allowing for spatial autocorrelation within
cutoff of 30km is used.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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1.10 Appendix: Additional Figures and Tables
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Figure A.1: Map of Agricultural Cultivation in Cirebon Residency,
1853
This map shows, shaded in dark grey, that there was no sugar cultivation along my
study border in the south of Cirebon. The only pockets of sugar cane cultivation lay
along the middle portion of the Priangan-Cirebon border and in Central Cirebon,
away from my study border. Source: Fernando (1982).
62
Figure A.2: 1853 Dutch Maps
These maps were created by Dutch cartographers simultaneously with a village-level
land use survey at a scale of 1:2 500 (1cm to 25m). Reproduction was allowed only
after those in charge of statistical survey declared that land use was displayed
correctly.
Table A.1: Moonlighting, Whether Chief Had Second Job While in Office: Fuzzy
RD
=1 if Missing Response =1 if Chief Had Second Job
Sample Within: 30 km 20 km 10 km 30 km 20 km 10 km
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
bengkok 0.034 0.016 0.036 0.103** 0.097** 0.115
(0.041) (0.041) (0.040) (0.044) (0.046) (0.084)
Observations 339 281 185 264 218 144
Mean Dep. Var 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.54 0.55 0.49
First Stage F Statistic 10.0 8.8 4.0 7.9 7.4 3.7
Note: Unit of observation is at the village chief level. Outcome in columns (1) -
(3) is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a chief reported having had a second
job during his term of office. Sample in columns (1) - (3) includes all past and
present village chiefs who had a non-missing response and is smaller because of
non-responses. Outcome in columns (4) - (6) is an indicator variable that equals
1 if a chief did not respond to the question of whether he had a second job while
in office. Source: Original survey data. Controls: Village-level mean elevation,
slope, an indicator for whether the election took place before 1999 and border
segment fixed effects. Conley standard errors allowing for spatial autocorrelation
within cutoff of 30km is used.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table A.2: Contemporary Development, Light Intensity: Robustness to Alt. RD
Polynomials
Nighttime Light Intensity, IHS
Sample Within: 30 km 20 km 10 km
(1) (2) (3)
Baseline 0.114* 0.165*** 0.208***
(0.060) (0.046) (0.054)
Quad. in Lat. Lon. 0.094*** 0.087*** 0.082***
(0.016) (0.020) (0.024)
Cubic in Lat. Lon. 0.126*** 0.144*** 0.102***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.026)
Cubic in Distance 0.205*** 0.196*** 0.128***
(0.040) (0.033) (0.027)
Observations 3820 3240 2020
Mean Dep. Var 2.18 2.32 2.49
Note: This table reports estimates from variants of equation (1.1) using outcomes
of nighttime light intensity as in Panel A of Table 1.4. Unit of observation is at
the village level and baseline specification includes baseline controls of elevation,
slope and border segment fixed effects. Conley standard errors allowing for spatial
autocorrelation within cutoff of 30km is used.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table A.3: Contemporary Development, % Children Died: Robustness to Alt. RD
Polynomials
% Children Died
Sample Within: 30 km 20 km 10 km
(1) (2) (3)
Baseline =0.625*** =0.583*** =0.474***
(0.211) (0.210) (0.158)
Quad. in Lat. Lon. =0.443*** =0.467*** =0.341*
(0.141) (0.167) (0.195)
Cubic in Lat. Lon. =0.489** =0.393*** =0.321*
(0.226) (0.134) (0.168)
Cubic in Distance =0.480*** =0.450*** =0.376***
(0.082) (0.064) (0.042)
Observations 21709 17947 11027
Mean Dep. Var 2.43 2.41 2.23
Note: This table reports estimates from variants of equation (1.1) using outcomes
of number of dead children as proportion of total children ever born as in Panel
B of Table 1.4. Unit of observation is at the individual level and baseline
specification includes baseline controls of village-level elevation, slope, 5-year
cohort, and border segment fixed effects. Conley standard errors allowing for
spatial autocorrelation within cutoff of 30km is used.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table A.4: Contemporary Development, Years of Education, Villagers: Robustness
to Alt. RD Polynomials
Years of Education, Villagers
Sample Within: 30 km 20 km 10 km
(1) (2) (3)
Baseline 0.208** 0.177*** 0.233***
(0.090) (0.050) (0.065)
Quad. in Lat. Lon. 0.153*** 0.173*** 0.169*
(0.040) (0.057) (0.090)
Cubic in Lat. Lon. 0.154*** 0.192*** 0.191*
(0.048) (0.067) (0.099)
Cubic in Distance 0.230*** 0.239*** 0.168***
(0.040) (0.040) (0.029)
Observations 204189 173744 113862
Mean Dep. Var 6.50 6.55 6.67
Note: This table reports estimates from variants of equation (1.1) using outcomes
of the number of years of education of each villager as reported in the 2010
Indonesian Population Census as in Panel C of Table 1.4. Unit of observation
is at the individual level and baseline specification includes baseline controls of
village-level elevation, slope, 5-year cohort, and border segment fixed effects.
Conley standard errors allowing for spatial autocorrelation within cutoff of 30km
is used.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table A.5: Contemporary Development, Light Intensity: Robustness to Additional
Controls
Nighttime Light Intensity, IHS
Sample Within: 30 km 20 km 10 km
(1) (2) (3)
Baseline 0.114* 0.165*** 0.208***
(0.060) (0.046) (0.054)
Controls: Agriculture 0.103* 0.156*** 0.215***
(0.054) (0.032) (0.064)
Controls: Geography 0.100 0.090*** 0.123***
(0.071) (0.034) (0.020)
Controls: Government 0.089* 0.129** 0.213***
(0.050) (0.052) (0.060)
Observations 3820 3240 2020
Mean Dep. Var 2.18 2.32 2.49
Note: This table reports estimates from variants of equation (1.1) using outcomes of
nighttime light intensity as in Panel A of Table 1.4. Unit of observation is at the
village level and baseline specification includes baseline controls of elevation, slope
and border segment fixed effects. Agricultural controls include rice potential yield
and coffee potential yield. Geographical controls include, in addition to elevation
and slope in the baseline, ruggedness and drainage. Government controls are
proxies for ease of government access and includes distance to sub-district and
district capital. Conley standard errors allowing for spatial autocorrelation within
cutoff of 30km is used.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table A.6: Contemporary Development, % Children Died: Robustness to
Additional Controls
% Children Died
Sample Within: 30 km 20 km 10 km
(1) (2) (3)
Baseline =0.625*** =0.583*** =0.474***
(0.211) (0.210) (0.158)
Controls: Agriculture =0.642*** =0.575*** =0.378***
(0.171) (0.149) (0.095)
Controls: Geography =0.620* =0.504* =0.286**
(0.361) (0.258) (0.142)
Controls: Government =0.647*** =0.695*** =0.720**
(0.226) (0.268) (0.317)
Observations 21709 17947 11027
Mean Dep. Var 2.43 2.41 2.23
Note: This table reports estimates from variants of equation (1.1) using outcomes of
number of dead children as proportion of total children ever born as in Panel B of
Table 1.4. Unit of observation is at the individual level and baseline specification
includes baseline controls of elevation, slope, 5-year cohort, and border segment
fixed effects. Agricultural controls include rice potential yield and coffee potential
yield. Geographical controls include, in addition to elevation and slope in the
baseline, ruggedness and drainage. Government controls are proxies for ease
of government access and includes distance to sub-district and district capital.
Conley standard errors allowing for spatial autocorrelation within cutoff of 30km
is used.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table A.7: Contemporary Development, Years of Education, Villagers: Robustness
to Additional Controls
Years of Education, Villagers
Sample Within: 30 km 20 km 10 km
(1) (2) (3)
Baseline 0.208** 0.177*** 0.233***
(0.090) (0.050) (0.065)
Controls: Agriculture 0.226** 0.176*** 0.202***
(0.088) (0.033) (0.048)
Controls: Geography 0.185 0.087 0.162**
(0.150) (0.058) (0.065)
Controls: Government 0.215** 0.158*** 0.267**
(0.092) (0.059) (0.109)
Observations 204189 173744 113862
Mean Dep. Var 6.50 6.55 6.67
Note: This table reports estimates from variants of equation (1.1) using outcomes
of the number of years of education of each villager as reported in the 2010
Indonesian Population Census as in Panel C of Table 1.4. Unit of observation
is at the individual level and baseline specification includes baseline controls of
elevation, slope, 5-year cohort, and border segment fixed effects. Agricultural
controls include rice potential yield and coffee potential yield. Geographical
controls include, in addition to elevation and slope in the baseline, ruggedness
and drainage. Government controls are proxies for ease of government access
and includes distance to sub-district and district capital. Conley standard errors
allowing for spatial autocorrelation within cutoff of 30km is used.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table A.8: Colonial Administrative Policy
Panel A: 1853 Maps
% Village Land % Village Land 1853 Road Density
Settled Grew Coffee
sample within: 30 km 20 km 10 km 30 km 20 km 10 km 30 km 20 km 10 km
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
bengkok 0.998 2.583 4.973** 3.456** 4.201** 5.049***0.732** 0.790** 1.237***
(2.108) (2.415) (1.979) (1.611) (1.790) (1.192) (0.317) (0.398) (0.432)
Observations 193 164 103 193 164 103 193 164 103
Mean Dep. Var 6.11 7.09 9.58 2.05 2.33 2.69 1.52 1.78 2.13
Panel B: 1945 Maps
1945 Road Density 1945 Rail Density
sample within: 30 km 20 km 10 km 30 km 20 km 10 km
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
bengkok =1.431* 0.160 1.817***=0.716***=0.619***=0.310
(0.761) (0.763) (0.528) (0.253) (0.229) (0.240)
Observations 193 164 103 193 164 103
Mean Dep. Var 4.27 4.64 5.44 0.32 0.38 0.56
Note: Unit of observation is village-level. I include border fixed effects. All measures
calculated from 1853 Dutch maps overlaid over 2000 village border polygons.
The unit of measure for road and rail density is meters per hectare. In successive
columns, I limit the sample to include only villages located less than 30km, 20km,
and 10km from the historical Cirebon-Priangan Residency boundary. Conley
standard errors for difference in means between Cirebon and Priangan villages
are in brackets (assuming a cut-off window of 30km).
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table A.9: Contemporary Development, Light Intensity: Robustness to Differences
in Colonial Administration
Nighttime Light Intensity, IHS
Sample Within: 30 km 20 km 10 km
(1) (2) (3)
Baseline 0.114* 0.165*** 0.208***
(0.060) (0.046) (0.054)
% Land Settled 1853 0.116* 0.157*** 0.191***
(0.065) (0.053) (0.062)
% Grew Coffee 1853 0.126** 0.172*** 0.219***
(0.064) (0.050) (0.058)
1853 Road Density 0.111* 0.161*** 0.197***
(0.059) (0.044) (0.054)
1945 Road Density 0.134** 0.165*** 0.195***
(0.056) (0.042) (0.059)
1945 Rail Density 0.122* 0.168*** 0.208***
(0.067) (0.052) (0.052)
Observations 3820 3240 2020
Mean Dep. Var 2.18 2.32 2.49
Note: This table reports estimates from variants of equation (1.1) using outcomes
of nighttime light intensity as in Panel A of Table 1.4. Unit of observation is at
the village level and baseline specification includes baseline controls of elevation,
slope and border segment fixed effects. Each additional row includes the control
variables as stated in the row header. Conley standard errors allowing for spatial
autocorrelation within cutoff of 30km is used.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table A.10: Contemporary Development, % Children Died: Robustness to
Differences in Colonial Administration
% Children Died
Sample Within: 30 km 20 km 10 km
(1) (2) (3)
Baseline =0.625*** =0.583*** =0.474***
(0.211) (0.210) (0.158)
% Land Settled 1853 =0.620*** =0.584*** =0.463**
(0.197) (0.217) (0.197)
% Grew Coffee 1853 =0.647*** =0.609*** =0.501***
(0.234) (0.234) (0.172)
1853 Road Density =0.632*** =0.587*** =0.489***
(0.222) (0.224) (0.186)
1945 Road Density =0.634*** =0.584*** =0.480***
(0.212) (0.201) (0.158)
1945 Rail Density =0.573*** =0.550*** =0.481***
(0.188) (0.193) (0.168)
Observations 21709 17947 11027
Mean Dep. Var 2.43 2.41 2.23
Note: This table reports estimates from variants of equation (1.1) using outcomes of
number of dead children as proportion of total children ever born as in Panel B of
Table 1.4. Unit of observation is at the individual level and baseline specification
includes baseline controls of elevation, slope, 5-year cohort, and border segment
fixed effects. Each additional row includes the control variables as stated in the
row header. Conley standard errors allowing for spatial autocorrelation within
cutoff of 30km is used.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table A.11: Contemporary Development, Years of Education, Villagers: Robustness
to Differences in Colonial Administration
Years of Education, Villagers
Sample Within: 30 km 20 km 10 km
(1) (2) (3)
Baseline 0.208** 0.177*** 0.233***
(0.090) (0.050) (0.065)
% Land Settled 0.208** 0.167*** 0.216***
(0.095) (0.056) (0.072)
% Grew Coffee 0.191** 0.156*** 0.209***
(0.084) (0.043) (0.060)
1853 Road Density 0.207** 0.173*** 0.228***
(0.093) (0.050) (0.068)
1945 Road Density 0.222*** 0.177*** 0.220***
(0.085) (0.047) (0.068)
1945 Rail Density 0.204** 0.176*** 0.235***
(0.084) (0.049) (0.067)
Observations 204189 173744 113862
Mean Dep. Var 6.50 6.55 6.67
Note: This table reports estimates from variants of equation (1.1) using outcomes
of the number of years of education of each villager as reported in the 2010
Indonesian Population Census as in Panel C of Table 1.4. Unit of observation
is at the individual level and baseline specification includes baseline controls of
elevation, slope, 5-year cohort, and border segment fixed effects. Each additional
row includes the control variables as stated in the row header. Conley standard
errors allowing for spatial autocorrelation within cutoff of 30km is used.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table A.12: Top-Down Provision of Roads Across the RD Border
2017 Roads
Intercity Local
Sample Within: 30 km 20 km 10 km 30 km 20 km 10 km
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
cirebon border =0.534 =0.536 =0.032 0.433 =0.182 0.017
(0.602) (0.681) (0.651) (3.247) (2.920) (2.889)
Observations 193 164 103 193 164 103
Mean Dep. Var 2.48 2.66 2.67 18.24 19.27 20.52
Note: Unit of observation is at the village level. Outcome in column (1) - (3)
is intercity road density in 2017. Outcome in column (4) - (6) is local road
density in 2017. Road density is calculated by dividing total road length (metres)
within each village polygon by the size of each village polygon (hectares). Source:
IRMS Indonesian Data. Controls: Village-level mean elevation, slope, and border
segment fixed effects. Conley standard errors allowing for spatial autocorrelation
within cutoff of 30km is used.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Chapter 2
Ethnic Segregation and Identity Politics:
Evidence from Malaysia
2.1 Introduction
Over the past decade, polticians have campaigned succesfully off a growing resurgence
of identity politics. Previously seen as a hallmark of poor developing economies,
anti-immigrant, nativist electoral platforms have propelled strong-man leaders into
power in the largest and most mature democracies.12 There are reasons to be
concerned. Discriminatory policies, introduced off the back of these platforms, might
have negative effects on economic development and growth if they condition access
to resources or networks based on ethnicity (De Luca et al., 2018; Franck and Rainer,
2012), race (Cook, 2011) or national identity (Ager and Hansen, 2017; Doran and
Yoon, 2018; Moser and San, 2019; Tabellini, 2020).3 More directly, divisive, identity-based
politics can lead to large-scale ethno-communal violence, the effects of which might
be negative for development (Horowitz, 2000).
Why does identity politics thrive in some places but not in others? In the U.S
context, researchers often cite a growing urban-rural divide and the proliferation of
1The elections of Narendra Modi in 2014, Donald Trump in 2016, and Matteo Salvini (Lega
Nord) in 2019 are commonly cited as examples of how voters have flocked to the polls to vote in
strong-man leaders who ran on electoral platforms of anti-immigration, nativist policies.
2Identity politics can be thought of as a subset of populism. See Guriev and Papaioannou (2020)
for an overview.
3Banerjee and Pande (2007) find that stronger voter preferences for co-ethnic politicians leads to
a fall in the quality of politicians.
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echo chambers as key factors (Bursztyn et al., 2019; Chen and Rohla, 2018).4 Yet,
what are the reasons for this divide? On one hand, a number of studies, based on
contact theory, suggests that the extent and type of inter-group contact can play a
key role (de Kadt and Sands, 2019; Brown et al., 2020).5 On the other, racial threat
theory (Key Jr, 1949) suggests that both the size and proximity of the outgroup
is sufficient to influence political behavior. Empirically, it is difficult to distinguish
causal effects of either theory from endogenous sorting.
This paper asks: To what extent can the roots of identity politics be traced
to inter-group segregation? I use a large-scale, rapid, rural resettlement program
carried out by the British in Malaysia to answer this question (1948-1952). Malaysia
presents an ideal setting. Malaysian politics continues to be characterized, to a large
extent, by polarization along identity lines, with a large literature arguing that the
roots of this persistence lies in disciminatory British colonial policy (Horowitz, 2000).6
Building on the growing literature that estimates the effects of critical junctures in
history (Banerjee and Iyer, 2005; Dell and Olken, 2020), I identify the consequences
of persistent ethnic segregation, arising from historical resettlement and incomplete
land titles, on the rise and persistence of ethno-communal politics in Malaysia. In
the post-WWII battle for the “hearts and minds” of local settlers, British distrust
of ethnic Chinese as communist sympathizers led to the relocation of 500,000 rural
ethnic Chinese squatters (a quarter of all Chinese in Malaya and a tenth of the
entire population) into 550 wired-in mono-ethnic Chinese “New Villages” camps.
4See Klein (2020) for a non-academic, book-length overview.
5The effect of contact on trust and attitudes, separate from political preferences expressed at
the ballot box, is also likely to be an important channel. Kasara et al. (2017) finds that higher
inter-ethnic segregation, instrumented by historical settlement patterns, leads to greater ethnic
conflict in Kenya. Abel (2019) documents that closer proximity to dismantled black resettlement
camps leads to persistently higher levels of in-group and general trust today. This is attributed to
higher solidarity among the oppressed.
6Since independence in 1962, the ruling coalition, up till 2018, comprised of individual
ethno-communal parties representing ethnic Malays, Chinese, and Indian interests
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The resulting segregation between Chinese camps and Malays has largely remained
even after the restoration of free movement and independence of Malaysia in 1962.7
Given explicit military objectives, British resettlement of Chinese villagers could
have led to plausibly exogenous differences in inter-ethnic segregation patterns. Hence,
to estimate the effect of inter-group segregation on voter demand for ethnic politics,
I compare vote shares for the ruling, ethno-nationalistic coalition, in polling districts
of varying proximity to mono-ethnic Chinese villages where proximity is measured
as the distance between a polling district and the nearest Chinese New Village.
To allay concerns of plausible endogeneity of (distance from) camp locations, my
baseline OLS specification uses nearest chinese camp fixed effects (FE). The inclusion
of nearest chinese camp FE allows me to restrict comparisons to the effect of the
same chinese camp on surrounding polling districts. Hence, this holds constant, to
a large extent, possible cross-camp differences owing from differences in planning or
other on-the-ground circumstances that might have differed across camps. Instead,
I compare the effects of being an additional kilometre away from a nearest chinese
camp arising from the maximization of military objectives subject to cost constraints,
with these differences in distance being plausibly unrelated to future voter demand
for ethnic politics.
I document the extent to which British resettlement affected modern-day ethnic
segregation patterns by using complete-count 2008 electoral registers to construct
measures of ethnic segregation and diversity at the intra-polling district level. This
data comprises more than 3.3 million individuals living in 2,085 polling districts. To
link ethnic segregation to modern-day voting outcomes, I combine electoral roll data
with voting data at the polling-center level. Specifically, I calculate two measures
of ethnic segregation at the polling-district level: dissimilarity and isolation (Cutler
7In 2002, as many as 1.25 (of 5.2 million) Chinese Malaysians continued to reside in NVs (Lim
and Fong, 2005).
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et al., 1999).8 By construction, dissimilarity and isolation capture the extent of
intra-polling district, residential ethnic segregation. Specifically, these measures are
calculated using ethnic shares acrossN sub-geographic units of neighborhood-localities
within each polling district. Across both measures, dissimilarity measures the even-ness
of ethnic distribution across neighborhood-localities whereas isolation measures the
exposure of ethnic Chinese (Malays) to ethnic Malays (Chinese) (Logan and Parman,
2017) within each neighborhood-locality. Notably, both measures are correlated with
but do not fully account for differences in aggregate ethnic composition at the polling
district level.
Based on a simple comparison of means, I first explore the extent to which
resettlement affected the ethnic composition and segregation of polling districts that
contain a Chinese camp. I find stark, persistent differences in ethnic composition
and segregation arising from resettlement. Within chinese camp polling districts, the
inclusion of the chinese camp neighborhood is associated with a 16.5p.p. (11.5p.p.)
increase (decrease) in aggregate ethnic Chinese (Malay) share and a 0.18 (0.49)
standard deviation increase in dissimilarity (isolation).
Generalizing this to a OLS setup with nearest Chinese camp fixed effects, I
find that a 1km increase (decrease) in distance (proximity) from a Chinese village is
associated with 0.85 percentage point increase in electoral support for the ethno-nationalistic
coalition. This translates to a 1.75 percentage increase off a mean of 49.2 percent.
I find suggestive evidence that this is driven by higher intergroup contact. A 1km
increase in distance is associated with a 1.63 percentage point increase (decrease) in
ethnic Malay (Chinese) share. At the same time, this increase (decrease) in ethnic
Malay (Chinese) share, is associated with a fall in residential segregation. Conditional
on ethnic share, a 1km increase in distance from Chinese village polling districts is
8In on-going work, I use granular details on residential location to study the effects of hyper-local
intergroup contact (Logan and Parman, 2017). I also observe interethnic marriages and will use this
as a key measure of identity and integration.
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associated with a 0.01 to 0.002 (0.04 to 0.06) s.d. fall in Malay (Chinese) isolation.
Taken together, these results suggest that higher voter shares for ethnic politics here
might be driven by higher inter-group contact and provides evidence more consistent
with a threat hypothesis and/or effects of, perhaps, more antagonistic contact. In
ongoing primary survey work, I plan to shed light on the key types of inter-group
contact in this setting, how this have evolved over time, and the presence of other
possible mediating factors.
This paper contributes to four strands of literature. First, it contributes to a
small but growing literature on the microeconomic effects of early-life, inter-group
contact on political preferences. In particular, in studying the end of race-based
busing in North Carolina in 2002, Billings et al. (2020) shows that being exposed
to a higher share of racial minorities amongst classmates decreases the likelihood of
registering as Republican in 2018. Consistent with the contact hypothesis, the authors
show that the effect is driven by (the majority) white-students. Much less, however, is
known about the (composite) causal effects of social interaction and higher exposure
to minorities from changes in residential segregation.9 I innovate by studying the effect
of plausibly exogenous inter-ethnic contact resulting from the haphazard relocation
of the minority ethnic Chinese out-group into the center of of pre-existing Malay
settlements in ethnic Malay-majority Malaysia. Resulting (incomplete) land leases
and the lack of clear ancestral homes tied resettled Chinese to these villages.10. In this
vein, my paper is closest to Enos (2016) who shows that, consistent with racial threat
theory and the fact that there was little cross-race interaction between whites and
blacks, the immediate demolition of Black public housing projects in Chicago led to
9A number of studies have studied the effects of residential segregation on ethnic and racial
conflict (Cook et al., 2018; Kasara et al., 2017). Separately, a growing body of work explores the
causal effects of exposure to immigrant in-flows on political preferences in the U.S. (Calderon et al.,
2019; Giuliano et al., 2020). These papers show that effects are attenuated in areas with higher
inter-group contact as measured by residential integration or intermarriages.
10At least for the formative years of their lives since most village schools go up to the 9th grade.
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lower turn-out and Republication vote share amongst white voters. The resettlement
and persistent presence of the Chinese, an ethnic minority outgroup in rural Malaysia,
into the middle of pre-existing Malay settlements, provides a unique opportunity to
test the extent to which racial threat can be attenuated by inter-group contact.
Second, I contribute to the literature on the supply and demand of identity
politics or nativist voting behavior. Guriev and Papaioannou (2020) provides an
overview of this in the context of the effects of inter-group contact on the rise of
populism. They find that most existing studies study the effect of (transient) refugees
on support for right-wing parties. In contrast, I study the effects of large-scale
resettlement that place previously “unknown”/foreign co-citizens into close contact
with a native population on preferences for identity politics. In this respect, this paper
is more similar to Giuliano et al. (2020); Alsan et al. (2018); Ager and Hansen (2017)
who study the effects of persistent in-group migration than Schindler and Westcott
(2017); Steinmayr who study the effects of transient contact on in-group preferences
and attitudes. It also provides evidence in line with Alsan et al. (2018) who find that
economic factors alone are insufficient in explaining historical support for nativist
parties in historical Massachusetts. Furthermore, recent studies have examined the
effects of intergroup contact on national identity arising from mandatory military
service and large-scale population resettlement on nation-building in Indonesia and
Nigeria, respectively (Bazzi et al., 2019; Okunogbe, 2018). Building on this body of
work, a series of planned surveys will examine the extent to which a strong national
vis-a-vis ethnic identity might act as a countervailing force against ethnic politics.
Third, I contribute to the small literature of inter-group contact on ethnic politics.
In the closest paper to mine, de Kadt and Sands (2019) shows that higher, pre-apartheid,
racial isolation of white South Africans increases racial voting for “white” parties.
Post-apartheid integration and racial mixing in South Africa, however, were largely
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driven by out-migration of black South Africans into previously white or unoccupied
areas. Hence, the type of individuals who selected into voluntary migration might
be a possible driver behind their results. I build on this by using a historical
resettlement program in rural Malaysia, allowing me to circumvent the issue of
(migrant) self-selection. Furthrmore, Malaysia is often called an incomplete democracy
that has become stuck in a middle-income trap, possibly a result of pervasive ethnic
politics and policies. In this sense, this paper contributes more broadly to a small
but growing literature on the microeconomic foundations underpinning macro-level
associations between ethnic segregation, divisions and various social and economic
outcomes (Alesina et al., 2003; Alesina and Zhuravskaya, 2011; Easterly and Levine,
1997; Fisman et al., Forthcoming).
Last, I contribute to a nascent literature on comparative development in Southeast
Asia (Bazzi et al., 2019; Dell et al., 2018; Dell and Olken, 2020). Due to data
limitations, Malaysia is extremely understudied.11 I contribute by studying a pivotal
episode in Malaysian economic history: the Malayan Emergency (1948-1962). A
rich anthropological literature has studied the effects of displacement and ethnic
segregation from a case-study perspective (dhu Renick, 1965; Voon and Khoo, 1986;
Wah, 1988). My study is, to the best of my knowledge, the first to combine multiple,
novel, historical and contemporary data sources to study the long-run effects of the
Emergency on contemporary political outcomes in peninsular Malaysia.
The paper proceeds as follows. Sections 2 and 3 provide relevant background
on the colonial resettlement program and the evolution of ethnic politics. Section 4
describes my data and empirical strategy. Section 5 presents main results. Section 6
concludes.
11See Miner (2015) for an exception.
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2.2 Historical Background: Chinese New Villages and the
Malayan Emergency
The end of World War II in British Malaya precipitated the start of the Communist
Emergency, a drawn-out political struggle between the returning British and ethnic
Chinese communists between 1949 to 1960. In 1949, in response to the assasination of
the British high commisioner, the British decided on a military strategy, euphemestically
termed the ”New Village Program”, to cut off supplies and support to communist
factions and to win the ”hearts and minds” of the locals (Voon 2011:1). Specifically,
the ”New Village Program” was a countrywide move that compulsorily transferred
existing widely dispersed ethnic Chinese inhabitants from scattered farms in rural
areas to defended areas or urban villages, located, designed and organized by the
State (Dobby 1965).
Program implementation, however, was largely unrelated to any goals of nation-building
or fostering ethnic diversity owing to the exigency of counter-communist insurgency
efforts and the devestation of the post-WWII British (Malayan) economy. Indeed,
despite recognizing the potential downside from the construction of “(highly) isolated
communities of alien inhabitants”, the British based relocation on twin aims of
minimizing costs and maximizing chances of a military victory (dhu Renick, 1965;
Dobby, 1952). To minimize costs, New Villages were often established within a
5-10km radius of original squatter camp locations. To maximize military objectives,
camps were located, to a certain extent, within the environs of existing Malay settlements,
away from communist danger areas, and along main thoroughfares. First, non-communist
Malays would act as a bulwark against interaction between camp inhabitants and
Commmunist insurgents. Second, locating camps on flat landscapes away from
high obseration points and forests would lessen the ambush risk from Communist
insurgents. Third, in the event of a communist ambush, camp location along main
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thoroughfares would allow the state to effectively channel reinforcements to ambush
hotspots.
As a result, what was essentially a stop-gap military strategy has had an unintended
long-term socio-demographic impact on the ethnic make-up of rural environs across
Malaysia. Quoting Dhu 1965: ”The biggest single effect that the Emergency in
Malaya has visibly accomplished ... (is the) resettlement or regrouping of nearly
650,000 ’squatters’ into more than 550 ’new villages’ (Dhu 1965: 1). Nearly 500,000
of these squatters were rural ethnic Chinese that constituted 1/4 of all Chinese in
Malaya and 1/10 of the entire population (Strauch 1981: 126). This resettlement
is largely responsible for the pattern of mono-ethnic urban neighborhoods we see
in Malaysia today: Sidhu (1967) shows that the ”phenomenal increase” in urban
centers from 163 to 402 from 1947 - 1957 was largely due to the resettlement of rural
Chinese into ”New Villages” which had a population of over 1000 and were classified
as urban in the 1957 census. This patern of ethnic segregation remains today: In
2002, 1,256,067 (out of 25,000,000) Malaysians continued to live in New Villages, of
which 82% identified as ethnic Chinese (Lim and Fong (2005)).
2.3 Historical Background: Ethnic Politics in Malaysia
Malaysia has had a political system organized along ethnic lines. Since independence
until 2018, Malaysia has been ruled by the National Front (BN), a coalition comprising
of the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), the Malaysian Chinese Association
(MCA), and the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC). These three component parties
represent respectively, Malay, Chinese, and Indian interests. Accordingly, electoral
platforms are centered around policies beneficial to the different ethnicities and this
has garnered a strong mandate from Malaysians. For example, under certain conditions,
Malays are prioritized for university entry and access to land under the FELDA
83
scheme. The Chinese also benefit from this system through, for example, State
recognition and continued upkeep of Chinese-language medium schools.
Ethnic politics in Malaysia, however, is not a modern-day phenomenon. It can
be largely traced to British colonial policy of “divide and rule” (Harper and Harper,
2001; Mamdani, 1997). In particular, the British frequently transplanted large waves
of immigrants to their colonies based on the perceived needs of their extractive
economies. This was no different in Malaysia. Eager to feed the needs of a nascent,
extractive, and labor-intensive tin and rubber industry, British-led efforts resulted
in the large-scale influx of ethnic Chinese and Indian labor beginning from the late
19th century. So much so that the ethnic Chinese were recognized as the single largest
community (50%) in the first British Malayan Census of 1950 (Freedman, 1960).12 To
ensure total control, the British entrenched racial stereotypes by assigning Malays,
Chinese, and Indians to occupations and residential towns based on ethnicity. To
prevent the emergence of a Pan-Malayan identity, they also frequently played the
ethnic card, encouraging distrust and competition between the different ethnic groups.
As a result, a rich socio-anthropological literature suggests that the resettlement
of ethnic Chinese into rural, mono-ethnic New Villages directly led to current-day
geographical segregation of voters along ethnic lines. Dobby (1952: 168, 173 -174)
documents how Chinese and Malays, in terms of numbers, representation and locational
advantage in each state, were previously balanced and how this balance was skewed
with the withdrawal of ethnic Chinese into New Villages. ”Resettlement ... involved
Chinese peasants who by ... urbanization acquired a new significance ... in the
political life of the country.” New Villages also played an important role in the history
of the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) through the provision of grassroots
support and the role of MCA cadres as middle-men for helping illiterate Chinese
12Specifically, given British territorial claims at that time, this figure was restricted to the
geographical expanse of Peninsular Malaysia or what is more commonly known as West Malaysia.
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villagers gain access to State resources (Heng (1988)). The question remains, however,
as to the extent to which ethnic geographical segregation stemming from British
resettlement policy is responsible for the observed persistence of ethnic politics.
2.4 Empirical Framework
This section describes my main data sources and the identification strategy I use to
estimate the long-term effect of colonial resettlement on current-day ethnic composition,
inter-ethnic residential segregation, and support for ethnic politics.
2.4.1 Data: Measuring Exposure to Chinese Villages, Ethnic Composition,
Segregation and Support for Ethnic Politics
I draw upon a wide range of historical, census, administrative and survey data to
measure proximity to Chinese villages, inter-ethnic group contact, and long-run voting
attitudes (in polling districts affected by large-scale resettlement of Chinese villagers).
Here, I detail core regressors and outcomes. In later sections, I introduce other
outcomes as they arise.
Location and Demographic Data of Chinese New Villages In my analysis, the
key margin of treatment is proximity to Chinese New Villages. Hence, I geo-locate,
to the best of my ability, Chinese New Village locations by hand-digitizing two
historical data sources: The 1958 Malayan Christian Council Census of Chinese New
Villages13 and Lim and Fong (2005). The latter comprises a complete census of
historical New Village school locations and assorted demographic data culled from
1980 goverment archival records, various local archival sources and primary fieldwork.
Historical school locations are especially important for geo-location. Fieldwork and
13From the National Malaysian/Singaporean archives. A copy of this can be found in humphreyHT
thesis, Appendix A
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qualitative evidence suggests that, in many instances, the British established Chinese
New Villages around pre-existing schools. In areas where there were none, the British
worked together with local community leaders to construct new schools. I verify the
persistence of these historical village locations by hand-matching historical village
names with geolocated, modern-day names of populated villages.14 My final, matched,
study sample comprises modern-day Chinese New Villages located in Peninsular
Malaysia, settled between 1949 to 1952.
The 1958 Census provides me with village-level characteristics at the time of
resettlement. These characteristics include type of amenities provided by colonial
authorities, distance to urban centers, linguistic use, occupational patterns, initial
population, and ethnic make-up.15 Table 2.1 shows descriptive statistics. These
villages were fairly large upon resettlement in 1952 but their population has decreased
over time. The average population at initial resettlement was and, in 2013, had
decreased to .16 Two other features are noteworthy. First, in line with military
objectives to win the “hearts and minds” of villagers, 82% were provided with some
form of medical facilities. In line with military defense objectives to facilitate quick
reinforcement by British troops, 72% of villages were situated along a main thoroughfare.
Second, despite the establishment of medical amenities and the importance of accessibility
to military reinforcements, the importance of minimizing relocation costs appears
to have won over: resettled villages were overwhemingly rural: In 1952, only 16%
14Following Dell and Olken (2020), I draw upon modern-day village names from the US Army
NGHIS database. Where this fails, I verify matches using historical school names and locations from
the 1958 Census together with current census locality names from Google Maps API and modern
electoral roll data.
15For a subset of these variables, data is incomplete. Hence, my prefered baseline specification
includes only distance to urban centers and initial population, historical variables which are available
for all villages, as controls.
16Preliminary evidence suggests that new villages, over time, might have fragmented or spilled
over into adjacent localities within the same polling district. Hence, smaller average population
here does not necessarily mean that the number of inhabitants had decreased sharply over time.
Using original village borders from village archives we collect, ongoing work seeks to account for all
localities that lie within original new village boundaries.
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were located within 5 miles of a urban center (defined as a town of 10,000 or more
inhabitants).
Proximity and isolation to New Villages I compute measures of proximity
between polling districts that contain Chinese New Villages and surrounding polling
districts. I also construct measures of intra-polling district residential segregation.17
My baseline sample comprises of segregation measures constructed from individuals,
of which reside in Chinese New Villages. I focus on interactions between the two main
ethnic groups: the Malays and Chinese.
I construct three measures of proximity and residential segregation. To measure
proximity, I compute the (fly-by-crow) distance between each polling district and
the nearest Chinese New Village. To measure segregation and inter-group contact, I
construct standard indices of polling district-level dissimilarity and isolation calculated
across geographic subunits of contiguous localities (lokaliti) as defined by the Electoral
Commission. Dissimilarity is a measure of evenness across geographic subunits.
Isolation is a measure of exposure, or the degree of potential contact between groups

















Regression results for both are similar and hence, I report results only for isolation
in later tables.
Electoral Support for Ethnic Politics My main outcome for voter preferences
for ethnic politics is an indicator for whether voters in a polling-district voted for
17The mapping between electoral seats and different tiers of administrative-levels at where voters
are registered to vote are as follows: Candidates run in federal or state parliamentary seats and
voters within each parliament seat are divided into polling districts (Daerah Mengundi). Each
polling district is further divided into neighborhoods (lokalities) and one or more polling districts,
together, vote at a single polling centre.
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the National Front (Barisan Nasional. Henceforth, BN) coalition. I use voting data
from the Electoral Commission of Malaysia to measure electoral outcomes at the
polling-district level. This data records the number of votes won by each coalition-party
candidate within each State and Federal legislative seat between 1980-2014. As
a first pass, I restrict my sample to voting outcomes in the 2013 elections. My
baseline sample comprises of electoral results for 116 (out of a total of 222) federal
parliamentary seats, disaggregated across polling districts. Table 2.1 shows that BN
lost by an average vote margin of 15% in polling districts that contain a Chinese
village.
2.4.2 Identification
To study the plausibly exogenous effects of haphazard resettlement into Chinese New
Villages, I estimate the following equation using ordinary least squares (OLS):
ydcp = α + γ distancedc + x
′
cβ + αc + εmcp
(2.1)
The main coefficient of interest is γ: the effect of proximity to a Chinese New
Village c on outcomes ydcp in polling district d and parliament seat p. If Chinese New
Villages were indeed randomly placed, OLS is plausibly unbiased. This is plausible
owing to the exigency and haphazardness by which the British resettled Chinese
squatters. Standard errors are clustered at the federal parliament seat X nearest
Chinese village level.
A close reading of the historical evidence, however, suggests that deviations
from broad top-down directives were prevalent across local British War Committees.
Hence, the re-location decision of Chinese New Villagers and their resulting location
might be correlated with other omitted variables. For example, historical evidence
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suggests that extremist, communist-supporting, Chinese New Villagers were more 
likely to be relocated to villages closer to main thorough-fares or artery highways. 
Hence, if these villages were treated more harshly or better transportation networks 
are correlated with contemporary political attitudes, OLS estimates might be biased. 
For example, if as a result of higher connectivity, villagers were more likely to engage in 
cross-ethnic interactions, OLS might be biased. To mitigate this, I include fixed
effects, αc, for the nearest Chinese village. While falling short of estimating a fully 
causal relationship, this allows me to control for omitted variables that might differ 
across resettlement locations and better isolate the effects of resettlement arising solely 
from differences in proximity from a single, common Chinese village.
2.5 Results
This section presents core empirical results. First, I show that resettlement of scattered 
Chinese squatters into mono-ethnic villages had long-run effects on the spatial 
distribution of ethnic share and isolation both within and across immediate chinese 
camp polling districts. Second, I generalize this in a OLS framework by showing that 
differences in proximity to chinese villages is closely linked to malay ethnic share and 
inter-ethnic segregation. Third, I identify downstream effects on support for ethno-
nationalistic politics. I present core robustness checks along the way.
To understand the first-order effects of resettlement, I proceed in two steps. First,
I compare differences in observable characteristics of chinese camp polling districts 
with and without chinese camp neighborhood-localities. Second, I explore the extent to 
which these differences extended to surrounding polling districts by comparing 
differences across chinese camp polling districts and contiguous districts that share a 
common border. In the first instance, I simply compare raw means with and without 
chinese camp neighborhood-localities. In the second, I estimate the following equation
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yd = α + θ Chinesed + αc + εd. yd is some outcome measure for polling district d and 
Chinesed is an indicator equal to one for polling districts that contain a Chinese village 
and zero otherwise. Hence, θ measures differences in key outcomes yD between
a Chinese Village polling district and a polling district whose boundary just touches 
said polling district.
Table 2.2 shows that the effects of resettlement on ethnic composition and 
segregation were felt most strongly within the polling districts in which they were 
located. Specifically, the inclusion of a chinese camp (neighborhood) is associated with 
a 16.5p.p. (11.5p.p.) increase (decrease) in aggregate ethnic Chinese (Malay) share and 
a 0.18 (0.49) standard deviation increase in dissimilarity (chinese isolation). These 
differences translate into a 36% (28%) increase (decrease) in aggregate ethnic Chinese 
(Malay) share and a 54% (188%) increase in dissimilarity (chinese isolation).
I next examine differences in characteristics across chinese camp polling districts 
and contiguous, adjacent districts. Table 2.3 demonstrates that colonial resettlement 
resulted in stark, long-run differences in ethnic composition and segregation that 
extended beyond chinese camp polling districts. The first important takeaway is that 
resettlement did not lead to significant differences in total population. Chinese Village 
districts are slightly less populated compared to surrounding districts but this
is entirely consistent with a historically lower ethnic Chinese birth rate. What stands 
out, however, is that resettlement resulted in a significant, spatial shift in district 
ethnic composition. Immediately adjacent polling districts have 30.4 percentage points 
(p.p.) more ethnic malays and this increase is accounted for, nearly one-for-one, by a 
large fall in ethnic Chinese share (35.5 p.p.). More importantly, 1950s resettlement, 
despite the long time-lag, has had a stark, long-lasting effect on residential segregation 
patterns. Chinese (Malay) isolation indices for adjacent polling districts are 0.37 s.d. 
lower  (0.23  s.d.  higher),  a  nearly  48%  decrease  (50%  increase)  off  a  mean  of  0.77
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(0.45). As a benchmark, the isolation index for black segregation was 0.32 and 0.22
in Southern and Northeastern U.S. cities, respectively in 1990 (Cutler et al., 1999).
The last two rows examine differences in political behavior. Even based off a
simple comparison of means, stark differences in voting behavior emerge: adjacent
polling districts are 16.7 p.p. more likely to vote for the ethno-nationalistic National
Front coalition. There do not, however, appear to be any substantial differences in
voter turnout.
2.5.1 Effects on Ethnic Composition
Table 2.4 estimates the effect of proximity to Chinese villages on contemporary ethnic
malay share, measured in 2013. Historical evidence is silent on the extent to which
resettlement effects might have extended beyond adjacent polling districts. Hence,
I test for heterogeneity of effects of proximity and distance to Chinese villages by
presenting results for polling districts within three bandwidths of 25km, 15km and
10km.18 In Panel A, I estimate effects for all polling districts, including those in which
a Chinese village is situated. In Panel B, I exclude Chinese village polling districts
to examine the extent to which results might be driven by the rearrangement of
settlement patterns within Chinese village polling districts.
Across all specifications in Table 2.4, I find that resettlement resulted in a shift
of ethnic malays to surrounding polling districts. In Panel A, across columns 1-3,
I find that a one kilometre increase in proximity to the nearest Chinese village led
to a 1.8 to 4.4p.p. increase in ethnic malay share. Panel B shows that exclusion of
Chinese Village polling districts leads to effect sizes that are around a third smaller.
This is unsurprising: as demonstrated in Table 2.2, the largest effects of resettlement
were concentrated in districts immediately adjacent to chinese camp polling districts.
Consistent with historical evidence presented in Section 3 and 4, I interpret
1895% of polling districts in Peninsular Malaysia lie within 25km of a Chinese village.
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these estimates as evidence that historical resettlement resulted in a persistent shift
in the concentration and share of ethnic Chinese (vis-a-vis ethnic Malays) into Chinese
camp polling districts. (Incomplete) land titles are likely the key driver behind this
persistence. Pre-resettlement, Chinese settlers did not have land rights to the land
they squatted on. It was only under resettlement that the British granted Chinese
settlers titles to the house and surrounding land (dhu Renick, 1965). To many older
folk, these titles might be assets that their children would expect to inherit upon their
passing.
2.5.2 Effects on Segregation
I next show that resettlement had a sizeable impact on inter-ethnic segregation, above
and beyond differences in ethnic composition. Given the non-symmetry of isolation
indices, I examine the effects of resettlement on both Malay and Chinese isolation
in Table 2.5 and 2.6 respectively. For brevity, I present results for the full sample
of polling districts located within 25km of the nearest chinese village camp. In the
Online Appendix, I show that, similar to the results on ethnic malay shares, the
correlation between proximity and isolation increases as we progressively restrict the
sample to polling districts located within 15km and 10km.
I first examine effects on Malay isolation. Table 2.5, panel A, column 1, shows
that a one kilometre increase in proximity is associated with a 0.101 (0.068) s.d.
increase in isolation (excluding Chinese village polling districts). Moving to column
(2), the coefficient flips once I control for ethnic malay share (column 2), implying
that, conditional on ethnic malay share, a one kilometre increase in proximity is
associated with a 0.018 (0.009) s.d. decrease in ethnic Malay isolation (excluding
Chinese village polling districts). In column 3, I add a control for a squared term in
ethnic malay share to account for a potential non-linear effect of ethnic composition
(Cutler et al., 1999) and the coefficient remains stable.
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In Table 2.6, I estimate analagous equations using ethnic Chinese isolation as
a dependent variable. Across all columns, Table 2.6 shows that resettlement had a
nearly three times larger impact on the exposure of Chinese to Malays. Furthermore,
the correlation between distance and chinese isolation remains negative even when
controlling for ethnic malay share. In panel A, column 1, a one kilometre increase
in proximity is associated with a 0.159 (0.104) s.d. decrease in chinese isolation
(excluding Chinese village polling districts). Moving to column (2), the sign on
distance to the nearest chinese village camp remains negative but is significantly
attenuated. Specifically, conditional on ethnic malay share, a one kilometre increase
in proximity is associated with a 0.06 (0.03) s.d. decrease in ethnic chinese isolation
(excluding Chinese village polling districts). In column 3, I add a control for a
squared term in ethnic malay share and the coefficient remains stable. The size of
this coefficient is remarkable. Cutler et al. (1999) calculates a Black isolation index
of 0.32 and 0.22 for Southern and Northeastern U.S. cities respectively, in 1990. My
results on Chinese isolation imply that simply moving one kilometer away from a
chinese camp polling district is associated with an increase in residential segregation
akin to that of moving from Northeastern to Southern U.S. cities in 1990.
Overall, Table 2.5 and 2.6 provides suggestive evidence that resettlement led to
a marked increase (decrease) in segregation in polling districts located (closer to)
further away from Chinese village camps. I.e., inter-ethnic segregation patterns are
more pronounced in polling districts containing Chinese villages or located closer
to Chinese village polling districts even when holding ethnic composition constant.
Furthermore, resettlement had a larger impact on Chinese exposure to Malays as
compared to the impact on Malay exposure to Chinese. This makes sense given that
Malays comprise the ethnic majority in nearly everywhere other than Chinese village
camps. Hence, ethnic Chinese located in polling districts further away from chinese
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camps would be much more likely to encounter Malays in their immediate residential
environment and day-to-day interactions.
I have shown that resettlement had first-order impacts on ethnic composition
and segregation patterns both within and outside chinese camp polling districts.
Taken together, increases in ethnic malay share and decreases in isolation from
lower proximity to Chinese camps suggest that resettlement had persistently large,
positive effects on both inter and intra-district intergroup contact above and beyond
immediate polling districts. I next examine the extent to which these changes might
have translated into downstream effects on voter preferences for ethnic politics.
2.5.3 Effects on Electoral Support for Ethnic Policies
Since independence, the the National Front (BN) has won the popular vote in nearly
every election, riding on equal support from both ethnic Malays and Chinese who
believe in the efficacy of ethnic-based policies. In 2008, the multi-ethnic Coalition of
Hope (PH) started gaining in-roads by campaigning against the efficacy of ethnic-based
policies.
Hence, I use BN vote shares as a proxy for voter demand for ethnic politics. In
ongoing work, I expand my analysis to all election cycles between 1980 to 2018. For
now, I present results on BN vote shares in the 2008 election cycle for which I have
cleaned data on voting results at the polling district-level. I again present results for
polling districts within 3 bandwidths of 25km, 15km, and 10km of the nearest Chinese
village camp. I do this to test if effects on vote shares follow a similar pattern as that
of ethnic composition and segregation. Specifically, prior to the construction of a IV
strategy, if we assume that other unobservables or possible channels do not vary in the
same way, a similar pattern of increasing intensity of voter demand for ethnic politics
as I restrict my sample to districts in the immediate vicinity of chinese camps might
provide suggestive evidence that differences in ethnic composition and segregation
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could be the main driver behind any observed differences in voter demand for ethnic
politics.
Table 2.7 presents results on the partial correlation between proximity to the
nearest chinese village and BN vote shares. A 1 kilometer increase in distance from
a Chinese Village is associated with a 0.8 to 2.4 p.p. increase in vote share for the
National Front. Furthermore, as in Table 2.4, the largest effects of proximity are seen
when we restrict the comparison of vote shares to districts in the immediate vicinity
of chinese camp polling districts.
Together with similar patterns of persistently large, positive effects on intergroup
contact, these positive effects on BN vote shares suggest that the resettlement and
persistent concentration of ethnic Chinese into mono-ethnic camps, might have led to
increases in support outside of Chinese camps. This is plausibly consistent with more
antagonistic inter-group contact in polling districts less proximate to chinese camps.
In planned survey work, I will investigate the extent to which voter demand for
ethnic politics might be driven by alternative channels such as language proficiency,
inter-ethnic trust, attitudes, and national identity.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper offers new evidence on how intergroup contact shapes the prevalence
of identity politics. I study a large-scale resettlement program that placed 500,000
ethnic Chinese squatters, widely considered as unwelcome immigrants at the point of
resettlement, into 550 mono-ethnic villages. My findings illustrate how intergroup
contact can attenuate the demand for identity politics. To further validate my
proposed mechanism of contact and understand how inter-group contact shapes voting
behavior, I’ve secured funding to conduct a large-scale retrospective survey at the
household-level. The final survey will measure actual inter-group contact rates,
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attitudes and proxies for national identity.
Beyond Malaysia, my findings suggest that increases in intergroup contact may
affect voting preferences at the ballot box. In particular, to reduce inter-group
animosity, my results suggest that the use of policies to encourage inter-ethnic mixing
and reduction in inter-group segregation must take into account the idiosyncracies of
local contexts. More broadly, I provide empirical evidence for policies promoting
greater ethnic integration such as Moving To Opportunity in the U.S. (Chetty et al.,
2015) and apartment block-specific ethnic quotas in Singapore (Wong, 2013).
From a perspective of comparative development, the findings of this study are also
important for understanding difficulties faced by nascent democracies, like Malaysia,
in building a common national identity (Horowitz, 2000). Colonial policies arising
from critical junctures can have long-ranging consequences on modern polities/politics
(Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2016) and, if modern nations are to overturn these
disadvantages, it might be useful to identify these policies from the onset.
2.7 Figures and Tables
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Table 2.1: Historical and Current-Day Village Characteristics
Village Characteristics (1952) N Mean
(s.d.)
initial population 227 1510
(1338)
% with medical facility 173 82
(39)
% located on main highway 244 72
(44)
% < 5miles to urban centre (10,000) 243 16
(36)
Village Characteristics (2013)* N Mean
(s.d.)
population today 301 834
(674)
% chinese 301 82.2
(18.2)
% malay 301 11.9
(16)
% vote share (BN), 2013 301 35.1
(14.2)
Note: *At polling district-level. Source: 1958 Malayan Christian Census, modern
electoral rolls and voting data. Standard deviation in round brackets below mean
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Table 2.2: Current-Day Chinese Camp Polling District Characteristics: Including
Chinese Camp Localities
Excluding Chinese Camps Including Difference
(1) (2) (3)
population 1085 1866 780
(57.61) (61.83) (84.514)
ethnic malay share (%) 38.47 26.99 =11.48
(1.66) (1.40) (2.170)
ethnic chinese share (%) 46.10 62.62 16.51
(1.75) (1.51) (2.310)
dissimilarity index 0.33 0.50 0.18
(0.01) (0.01) (0.016)
isolation index, malay 0.44 0.48 0.04
(0.02) (0.02) (0.022)
isolation index, chinese 0.26 0.76 0.49
(0.01) (0.01) (0.018)
Number of Polling Districts 278 278 556
Note: This table examines the extent to which chinese camps altered ethnic composition
and segregation in their immediate environs by computing polling district-level
outcomes both without and with Chinese camp neighborhood localities. Sample size
here is smaller than the total number of matched chinese camp polling districts because
23 polling districts are comprised entirely of Chinese camps. Isolation index measures
residential segregation at the polling district-level across geographic sub-units of village
localities, of which there are as many as 25 with the median polling district having
9. A higher isolation index is associated with higher segregation. All indices are
standardized.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 2.3: Current-Day Polling District Characteristics by Chinese New Village
District and Adjacent Districts
NV Polling District Adjacent District Difference
(1) (2) (3)
population 1842 1962 =182
(59.0) (56.2) (75.0)
ethnic malay share (%) 25.44 49.70 30.4
(1.35) (1.81) (1.75)
ethnic chinese share (%) 64.7 36.7 =35.5
(1.48) (1.68) (1.80)
dissimilarity index 0.50 0.43 =0.034
(0.01) (0.01) (0.017)
isolation index, malay 0.45 0.60 0.23
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
isolation index, chinese 0.77 0.46 =0.37
(0.01) (0.02) (0.017)
number of localities 12.3 13.5 =1.03
(0.76) (0.74) (0.99)
BN vote share (%) 35.1 45.6 16.7
(0.82) (1.08) (0.995)
voter turnout (%) 82.47 84.13 1.00
(0.29) (0.29) (0.327)
Number of Polling Districts 301 1444 1745
Note: This table reports estimates of equation (2) and compares outcomes between
polling districts that contain a Chinese village and districts adjacent to them. Isolation
index measures residential segregation at the polling district-level across geographic
sub-units of village localities, of which there are as many as 25 with the median polling
district having 9. A higher isolation index is associated with higher segregation. All
indices are standardized. Robust standard errors clustered across (federal seat X nearest
Chinese village pairs).
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 2.4: OLS: Effect of Proximity to Chinese Villages on Malay Ethnic Share
Ethnic Malay Share (%)
Sample Within: 25km 15km 10km
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: All Polling Districts
distance to nearest chinese village 1.633*** 2.937*** 4.482***
(0.210) (0.253) (0.366)
Dependent Variable Mean 59.1 56.5 52.5
Remoteness Controls No No No
Nearest Village FE Yes Yes Yes
Share Malay Mean 59.1 56.5 52.5
Clusters 559 530 470
Number of Chinese Villages 301 301 301
Number of Poll. Districts 4.007 3.462 2.754
Panel B: Excluding Districts with Chinese Villages
distance to nearest chinese village 0.919*** 1.904*** 2.871***
(0.223) (0.306) (0.504)
Dependent Variable Mean 61.8 59.5 55.8
Remoteness Controls No No No
Nearest Village FE Yes Yes Yes
Share Malay Mean 61.8 59.5 55.8
Clusters 540 511 444
Number of Chinese Villages 0 0 0
Number of Poll. Districts 3.706 3.161 2.453
Note: This table reports estimates of equation (1) for the ethnic malay share at the
polling district level constructed from 2013 electoral rolls across various bandwidths
from the nearest Chinese New Village in kilometres. Remoteness Controls are dummies
for bins of distance of each Chinese village to the nearest urban centre (≥ 10, 000).
I.e. within 5,10,. . . ,30 miles. Robust standard errors clustered across (federal seat X
nearest Chinese village pairs).
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 2.5: OLS: Effect of Proximity to Chinese Villages on Malay Isolation
Segregation: Malay Isolation Index, Standardized
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: All Polling Districts
distance to nearest chinese village 0.101*** =0.018*** =0.015***
(0.011) (0.004) (0.004)
ethnic malay share (%) 0.027*** 0.040***
(0.000) (0.001)
malay ethnic share, squared =0.000***
(0.000)
Dependent Variable Mean -0.0 -0.0 -0.0
Remoteness Controls Yes Yes Yes
Share Malay Mean 52.3 52.3 52.3
Clusters 384 384 384
Number of Chinese Villages 278 278 278
Number of Poll. Districts 2,328 2,328 2,328
Panel B: Excluding Districts with Chinese Villages
distance to nearest chinese village 0.068*** =0.009** =0.008*
(0.015) (0.004) (0.004)
ethnic malay share (%) 0.027*** 0.039***
(0.000) (0.001)
malay ethnic share, squared =0.000***
(0.000)
Dependent Variable Mean -0.0 -0.0 -0.0
Remoteness Controls Yes Yes Yes
Share Malay Mean 55.4 55.4 55.4
Clusters 366 366 366
Number of Chinese Villages 0 0 0
Number of Poll. Districts 2,085 2,085 2,085
Note: This table reports estimates of equation (1) for segregation (isolation index (Cutler
et al., 1999)) at the polling district level constructed from 2013 electoral rolls. Isolation
index measures residential segregation at the polling district-level across geographic
sub-units of village localities, of which there are as many as 25 with the median polling
district having 9. ethnic malay share is the percentage of voters who self-identity as
ethnic malay. Remoteness Controls are dummies for bins of distance of each Chinese
village to the nearest urban centre (≥ 10, 000). I.e. within 5,10,. . . ,30 miles. Robust
standard errors clustered across (federal seat X nearest Chinese village pairs).
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 2.6: OLS: Effect of Proximity to Chinese Villages on Chinese Isolation
Segregation: Chinese Isolation Index, Standardized
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: All Polling Districts
distance to nearest chinese village =0.159*** =0.060*** =0.060***
(0.012) (0.007) (0.007)
ethnic malay share (%) =0.022*** =0.024***
(0.001) (0.002)
malay ethnic share, squared 0.000
(0.000)
Dependent Variable Mean 0.0 0.0 0.0
Remoteness Controls Yes Yes Yes
Share Malay Mean 52.3 52.3 52.3
Clusters 384 384 384
Number of Chinese Villages 278 278 278
Number of Poll. Districts 2,328 2,328 2,328
Panel B: Excluding Districts with Chinese Villages
distance to nearest chinese village =0.104*** =0.038*** =0.039***
(0.017) (0.008) (0.008)
ethnic malay share (%) =0.023*** =0.025***
(0.001) (0.002)
malay ethnic share, squared 0.000
(0.000)
Dependent Variable Mean 0.0 0.0 0.0
Remoteness Controls Yes Yes Yes
Share Malay Mean 55.4 55.4 55.4
Clusters 366 366 366
Number of Chinese Villages 0 0 0
Number of Poll. Districts 2,085 2,085 2,085
Note: This table reports estimates of equation (1) for segregation (isolation index (Cutler
et al., 1999)) at the polling district level constructed from 2013 electoral rolls. Isolation
index measures residential segregation at the polling district-level across geographic
sub-units of village localities, of which there are as many as 25 with the median polling
district having 9. ethnic malay share is the percentage of voters who self-identity as
ethnic malay. Remoteness Controls are dummies for bins of distance of each Chinese
village to the nearest urban centre (≥ 10, 000). I.e. within 5,10,. . . ,30 miles. Robust
standard errors clustered across (federal seat X nearest Chinese village pairs).
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 2.7: OLS: Effect of Proximity to Chinese Villages on BN Vote Share
National Front (BN) Vote Share (%)
Sample Within: 25km 15km 10km
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: All Polling Districts
distance to nearest chinese village 0.849*** 1.413*** 2.397***
(0.107) (0.138) (0.221)
Dependent Variable Mean 49.2 48.3 46.8
Remoteness Controls No No No
Nearest Village FE Yes Yes Yes
Share Malay Mean 59.1 56.5 52.5
Clusters 559 530 470
Number of Chinese Villages 301 301 301
Number of Poll. Districts 4.005 3.460 2.753
Panel B: Excluding Districts with Chinese Villages
distance to nearest chinese village 0.463*** 0.815*** 1.537***
(0.108) (0.159) (0.291)
Dependent Variable Mean 50.4 49.6 48.3
Remoteness Controls No No No
Nearest Village FE Yes Yes Yes
Share Malay Mean 61.8 59.4 55.8
Clusters 540 511 444
Number of Chinese Villages 0 0 0
Number of Poll. Districts 3.704 3.159 2.452
Note: This table reports estimates of equation (1) for the ethnic malay share at the
polling district level constructed from 2013 electoral rolls across various bandwidths
from the nearest Chinese New Village in kilometres. Remoteness Controls are dummies
for bins of distance of each Chinese village to the nearest urban centre (≥ 10, 000).
I.e. within 5,10,. . . ,30 miles. Robust standard errors clustered across (federal seat X
nearest Chinese village pairs).
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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